Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty

Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2015), reh'g denied (Mar. 15, 2016)

Inability of defendant to show manifestation of intellectual disability before age 18 does not, alone, result in failure of Atkins claim; Hall v. Florida requires a court to analyze all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard, and requires a different legal analysis of the onset prior to age 18 prong than was undertaken by the trial court.

Background: Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., was tried and convicted of robbery and first-degree murder in 1979 and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 1994, he sought postconviction relief but was denied. Post-Atkins, he filed a motion to vacate his death sentence on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, concluding that Oats had not been able to establish that his intellectual disability had manifested prior to age 18 as required by Florida’s statutory test for determining intellectual disability.

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court reversed, giving three reasons for its decision. First, it noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida indicated that the lower court should have addressed all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard and not denied the claim based on the apparent failure to meet one of the prongs. Second, the Court held that the lower court failed to consider all of the testimony presented, including evidence from prior postconviction proceedings. Third, the Court found that the lower court erroneously conflated “manifested” with “diagnosed,” an error upon which it based its conclusion that Oats failed to establish his intellectual disability.

Notable Points:

Hall v. Florida requires a circuit court to address all three prongs of the intellectual disability test rather than finding one factor to be dispositive: One of the three prongs of the intellectuality disability test is manifestation of the condition before age 18, but that determination is not dispositive. The Florida Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the trial court not to consider all three prongs of the intellectual disability test, and to rely solely on the third prong of the test in denying Oats’s claim. The Court, however, was careful to say that, although this was reversible error here, failure to consider all three prongs should not constitute per se reversible error. Nonetheless, all three prongs must be considered because they are interdependent and, even when one is not satisfied, “a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other prongs.”

The circuit court erred in making its conclusion without weighing all testimony presented by defendant: The Florida Supreme Court also held that it was error for the circuit court not to consider all the testimony that Oats presented. The parties stipulated to consideration of the mental health evidence presented in a previous proceeding, and the circuit court did not require the parties to recall all witnesses who testified previously. In its decision, however, the circuit court stated that it was “not in a position to reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified or the evidence” considered in those prior proceedings and simply accepted the postconviction court’s ruling. The Florida Supreme Court held that the lower court should have permitted the parties to recall the witnesses in a new proceeding and submit evidence so that it could be considered and weighed.

Legal standard for analyzing whether intellectual disability manifested before age 18: The Florida Supreme Court noted that the manifestation prong is used to ensure there was evidence of intellectual disability during the developmental period, and that to require evidence of diagnosis before age 18 would render the first two prongs of the standard moot. The Court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Hall as demonstrative of how evidence of manifestation, without affirmative diagnosis, can lead to a clear finding that the prong was established.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Intellectual Disability and Death Penalty

White v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000791-MR, 2016 WL 2604759 (Ky. May 5, 2016)

Kentucky Supreme Court overturns trial court ruling that defendant waived claim that he was not subject to the death penalty due to intellectual disability after defendant had refused to accept evaluation by a state psychiatric center to determine intellectual disability and insisted on state payment for evaluation by a private psychologist.

Background: In 1980, White was convicted by a Powell Circuit Court jury of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. He was sentenced to death for each of the three murders. Less than a month after he was sentenced, White was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which determined that he had an overall IQ score of 81. In 2004, White filed a motion in the Powell Circuit Court, based on Atkins v. Virginia, to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. White argued that the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) was incapable of conducting the necessary evaluations to determine his competence for the death penalty, and that the state should instead pay for an independent evaluation by an intellectual disability expert selected by White. Over the next several years, several orders for evaluation by the trial court and subsequent writs of prohibition by both White and the Commonwealth were entered. The trial court ultimately rejected White’s demand for an independent evaluation and ordered an evaluation by the KCPC. White refused to cooperate with the evaluation by the KCPC, which the trial court ruled was a waiver of his intellectual disability claim.

Holding: On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that White is not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment that White waived his right to an intellectual disability claim by refusing an evaluation by the KCPC.

Notable Points:

An evaluation by the KCPC does not violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during post-conviction proceedings: The court ruled that White’s Fifth Amendment rights would be minimally affected, if at all, by an evaluation by the KCPC. White was already tried and convicted of three murders; therefore, any inquiry by the mental health professionals into these crimes would not implicate the right.

Kentucky law barring executions of only those individuals with an IQ score of 70 or less was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014): The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the Hall decision “effectively invalidated our arbitrary intelligence score standard for evaluating” intellectual disability.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Case

Daniel v. Commr., Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 822 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2016)

Failure of defense counsel to adequately investigate and present at penalty hearing the deprivations and traumas of the defendant’s past as mitigation evidence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and entitle defendant to a new penalty phase hearing.

Background: Renard Daniel was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He filed for habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. Daniel claimed that counsel was deficient in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence and rebutting aggravating evidence. Daniel’s childhood included witnessing his mother kill his father when he was three years old, being sexually abused by his stepfather for several years beginning when he was nine years old, and a history of borderline intellectual functioning. Daniel’s petition claimed that the sentencing judge and jury heard none of these details, and that the failure to present this evidence also prejudiced the outcome of the penalty phase of his trial. The District court, for procedural and substantive reasons, denied his claim. Daniel appealed to the Circuit court.

Holding: The Second Circuit looked to the American Bar Association (ABA) guidelines to evaluate the standard for investigations into mitigating evidence. The ABA suggests that investigations “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” The court found that Daniel’s trial counsel made no meaningful contact with Daniel’s mother, siblings, or mental health professionals and actually ignored the family’s request to inform him of Daniel’s extensive history of intellectual disabilities and being sexually abused. The court found that any reasonable and competent attorney would have made a deeper investigation of Daniel’s history, and thus there was enough evidence to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court noted that evidence of mental problems, childhood abuse, and non-violent characterizations of past crimes is inherently mitigating and could change the jury’s mindset. It also found that the district court’s conclusion that Daniel failed to plead how he was prejudiced was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and federal law.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Intellectual Disability and Death Penalty

Hall v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 372 (2016)

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Florida, Florida Supreme Court finds that Hall meets the clinical, statutory, and constitutional requirements to establish that Hall’s intellectual disability precludes his being executed for the murders he committed.

Background: Freddie Lee Hall was convicted of murder in 1978 and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in 1981. After numerous appeals, Hall’s case received cert to the U.S. Supreme Court on a claim that Florida’s requirement that an inmate show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a determination of Hall’s intellectual disability. 

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court found that despite Hall’s IQ test scores above 70, he met the clinical definition of intellectually disabled based on evidence of organic brain damage, mental illness, and records indicating low intellectual ability. The court reversed the order of the circuit court denying post-conviction relief, vacated Hall’s death sentence, and imposed a life sentence.

Notable Point:

Age of onset for intellectual disability: The court reiterated that Florida statute requires only that intellectual disability be demonstrated to have manifested prior to age 18, not that it be diagnosed prior to age 18.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability

Thompson v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 510 (2016)

Florida Supreme Court reaffirms the rejection of a bright-line IQ cutoff of 70 in determining eligibility for the death penalty and holds it would be a manifest injustice not to give a defendant the benefit of the three-pronged test set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall.

Background: William Lee Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for a 1976 murder committed when Thompson was 24 years old. His sentence became final in 1993. Thompson filed numerous post-conviction motions claiming he is ineligible for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. Thompson’s IQ was measured by multiple experts with estimates ranging from 71–88. Thompson’s most recent post-Hall motion was denied by the circuit court because his IQ scores were generally over 80 and Hall only required courts to consider IQ scores 75 and below.

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing regarding Thompson’s intellectual disability. In reaching its decision, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a bright-line IQ cutoff for intellectual disability and directed lower courts to apply all three prongs of the Hall test rather than relying on any one prong as dispositive.

Notable Point:

Retroactive Effect of Hall: In a short dissent two justices reject the idea that Hall should apply retroactively and would therefore have denied Thompson relief.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4