Competency to be executed

Panetti v. Davis, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017)

Fifth Circuit finds petitioner who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death has a due process right to a hearing and funds for counsel and mental health experts to pursue a claim that he is not competent to be executed due to his serious mental illness.

Found in DMHL Volume 36, Issue 3

Execution of incompetent defendant

Madison v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 851 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2017)

Eleventh Circuit holds that defendant who, as a result of dementia developing after his conviction for capital murder had become incapable of remembering or understanding that he had committed the crime for which he was to be executed, was incompetent for execution under Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman

Found in DMHL Volume 36, Issue 2

Intellectual disability; execution

Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017)

U.S. Supreme Court reverses the ruling of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that defendant convicted of a capital crime was not intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court found that the state court deviated from the consensus of the medical community and relied on lay stereotypes of intellectual disability rather than accepted clinical standards.

Found in DMHL Volume 36, Issue 2

Intellectual Disability, Death penalty

State v. Russell, 238 So.3d 1105 (Miss. 2017)

The Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial court was incorrect in denying a State motion to evaluate a defendant on his claim of intellectual disability when considering the death penalty because testing completed for a previous charge was insufficient for State expert to form opinion.

Found in DMHL Volume 37, Issue 1

Death Penalty, Ineffective Assistance, Intellectual Disability

State v. Morrison, 236 So.3d 204 (Fla. 2017)

The Supreme Court of Florida denied a new evidentiary hearing for intellectual disability, granted a new penalty phase where counsel was ineffective in its penalty phase investigation, and withheld a new guilt phase because counsel was not ineffective in its guilt phase investigation.

Found in DMHL Volume 37, Issue 1

Death Penalty, Ineffective Assistance

Ellerbee v. State, 232 So.3d 909 (Fla. 2017)

The Supreme Court of Florida vacated a death sentence and granted a new penalty phase to the defendant because his counsel did not provide effective assistance at trial and the non-unanimous jury verdict regarding the sentence may have violated the Sixth Amendment.

Found in DMHL Volume 37, Issue 1

Death Penalty, Ineffective Assistance, Intellectual Disability

Reeves v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. 22 (2017)

The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari to hear a case involving ineffective assistance of counsel based on not obtaining psychological evaluation for intellectual disability. Of relevance here is the opinion of the dissenting Justices, who found that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly imposed a rule requiring trial counsel to testify in order for a petitioner to succeed on a federal constitutional ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Found in DMHL Volume 37, Issue 1

Missouri Supreme Court Bans Execution of Juvenile Offenders

State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003); 72(9) U.S. Law Week 1143-44 (Sept. 16, 2003)

The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the execution of defendants who were juveniles when they committed their offense is barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  Applying the analysis used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the court concluded that evolving standards of decency have similarly led to a national consensus opposing juvenile executions.  The court asserted that if the U.S. Supreme Court were to review its decision from 14 years ago in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), it would rule that "evolving standards of decency" mandate that the execution of 16- and 17-year-old offenders be found unconstitutional...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Virginia Capital Defendant Not Provided Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Just Because Defendant's Mental Health Expert Misdiagnosed Defendant

Bailey v. True, No. CR02-511 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2003); 17(51) Virginia Lawyers Weekly 1288 (May 26, 2003)

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to overturn the capital conviction of a defendant because of the purported ineffective assistance of counsel in presenting mental health evidence as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of the trial.  The defendant's claim was characterized as being that his mental health expert had misdiagnosed him as having a personality disorder when he should have been diagnosed as having a bipolar disorder...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Fourth Circuit Rejects Argument Capital Defendant Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Voluntary Intoxication and Insanity Defenses and Alford Plea

Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788 (4th Cir., 2003)

The Fourth Circuit rejected a Virginia capital defendant's argument he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to adequately investigate and advise the defendant on a voluntary intoxication defense, an insanity defense, and entering an Alford plea. The defendant, who claimed to have no memory of the crime, was convicted pursuant to his Alford plea of murdering an 80-year-old woman. Under an Alford plea, a defendant pleads guilty even though he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the crime....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Alcoholism and Intoxication Do Not Require Special Capital Sentencing Jury Instruction Identifying Them as Mitigating Factors Not Disturbed

Harris v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1576 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a Fifth Circuit ruling that upheld the capital sentence of a Texas man.  The defendant argued in part that the trial court was required to identify alcoholism or evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense as mitigating factors during the sentencing hearing. The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither constituted a "uniquely severe permanent handicap[ ] with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own," which would have required a special jury instruction under the Supreme Court's opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989). The Fifth Circuit also determined the jury was able to give mitigating effect to evidence of the defendant's alcoholism under jury instructions pertaining to deliberateness and future dangerousness and to evidence of the defendant's intoxication through the instruction on deliberateness...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Death Sentence: Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Defendant's Social History/Mental Health, Even Though Defendant Not Forthcoming and Opposed Investigation, Not Disturbed

Woodford v. Douglas, 316 F.3d 1079 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 49 (2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a Ninth Circuit ruling that a capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when counsel failed to adequately investigate defendant's social history and mental health for information that could have been used as mitigating evidence at sentencing.  The defendant thus was entitled to have his death sentence vacated even though he had not been forthcoming with information about his social history and was opposed to an investigation of his mental health.  The Ninth Circuit ruled trial counsel had a duty to investigate a defendant's mental state if there was evidence to suggest, as was the case here, that the defendant was impaired and this duty was not absolved by the defendant's refusal to cooperate when there was a significant and readily discoverable alternative source of information available....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Death Sentence Because Counsel Failed to Investigate and Present Defendant's Childhood Abuse as Mitigating Evidence Not Disturbed

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Woodford v. Karis, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 3795 (July 1, 2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review the ruling of the Ninth Circuit that overturned the imposition of the death penalty for ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because defendant's attorney failed to thoroughly investigate and present during the sentencing phase substantial mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's childhood history.  This evidence included abuse inflicted upon the defendant and his mother by his father and stepfather. Notwithstanding the family's denial of and reluctance to discuss this abuse, the Ninth Circuit said counsel should have investigated and presented this evidence in view of the extremely probative and wrenching nature of the evidence, the sparseness of the mitigating evidence actually offered, the prosecution's focus on the defense's failure to provide substantial mitigating evidence, and the fact the jury took three days to reach a verdict in favor of death.  The court stressed such evidence was vital for informing the jury about the background and character of the defendant in a capital case so that the defendant is treated as a uniquely individual human being and a reliable determination is made that death is the appropriate sentence...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Capital Conviction and Death Sentence Because Counsel Failed to Investigate Defendant's Mental Health and Drug Abuse Problems Not Disturbed

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Woodford v. Jennings, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 3795 (July 1, 2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a Ninth Circuit ruling that overturned a capital conviction and imposition of the death penalty for ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant's attorney failed to discover and present easily available evidence of the defendant's mental health and drug abuse problems despite knowing that the defendant had such problems.  The defendant was a habitual, heavy methamphetamine user, had attempted suicide, was described by a psychiatrist as schizophrenic, had a long history of injuring himself and pouring liquids in the resulting wounds causing gangrene, and had been involuntarily committed for psychiatric evaluation because he appeared catatonic. In addition, a number of individuals told the attorney they thought something was "seriously wrong" with the defendant...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Capital Conviction Because Counsel Failed to Request Diminished Capacity Jury Instruction to Reflect Defendant's "Explosive Dyscontrol" from Chronic Drug Use Not Disturbed

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Morgan v. Pirtle, 123 S. Ct. 2286 (2003); 71(47) U.S. Law Week 3756 (June 10, 2003)

Perhaps presaging its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Ninth Circuit that overturned a first-degree murder convic­tion for ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because defendant's attorney failed to request a dimin­ished capacity jury instruction. At trial, the defendant testified he ingested methamphet­amines, cocaine, and marijuana the night before the murder but was "coming down" three hours before the murder. Despite this evidence the drugs he used were wearing off three hours before the murder, defense counsel requested an intoxication instruction...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Officials Can Force Convicted Murderer to Take Medication to Make Sane Enough to Be Executed Not Disturbed

Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling by the Eighth Circuit that allowed Arkansas officials to force a convicted murderer to take medication intended to make him sane enough to be executed.  In 1986 the Supreme Court held that executing an insane individual violates the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. However, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether an individual can be forcibly medicated to be made sane enough to qualify for an execution...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Death Penalty Reversed Because Counsel Did Not Conduct "Reasonable" Investigation of Defendant's Childhood History

Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 1798-99 (July 1, 2003)

Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the "effective assistance" of an attorney.  In a Maryland case, the Supreme Court ruled a capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyers failed to conduct a "reasonable" investigation of the defendant's childhood history before deciding not to present related mitigation evidence at sentencing.  According to the Court, the attorneys should have pursued childhood privation and abuse leads brought to their attention by the records they reviewed...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Defendant Facing Capital Punishment Can Argue That "Flynn Effect" and Standard Error of Measurement Should Be Taken Into Account When Determining Whether IQ Score Established He Is Mentally Retarded

Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2005)

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on a defendant who is mentally retarded.  However, the Supreme Court left it to the states to define what constitutes mental retardation in this context. Virginia responded by enacting legislation that requires the defendant to establish that the disability originated before the age of 18, that it is characterized by a score two standard deviations below the mean on an approved standardized test, and significant limitations exist in the defendant's adaptive behavior. VA. CODE § 19.2-264.3: 1.1....

Found in DMHL Volume 24 Issue 2

Death Sentence Reversed Because Prosecution Failed to Provide Defense with a Parole File Containing Exculpatory Mental Health Evidence; Ruling Not Disturbed

Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003)

In Brady v. Maryland (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court established that the prosecution has a responsibility to provide the defense with material, exculpatory evidence in its possession and that a failure to do so is grounds for overturning a conviction. Questions have periodically arisen over when this responsibility to disclose extends to evidence pertaining to the defendant's mental status...

Found in DMHL Volume 24 Issue 2

Death Penalty for Juveniles Convicted of Murder Held to Be Unconstitutional Because a National Consensus Opposes Its Use and Juvenile Offenders Are Less Culpable Than Adults

Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005)

The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-to-4 decision that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on convicted murderers who were younger than 18 at the time of the crime. The Court concluded that such executions violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments."...

Found in DMHL Volume 24 Issue 2