Treatment of Mentally Ill Individuals in Custodial Settings: Custodial Interrogation

Police conduct with 18-year-old with Intellectual Disability is coercive under “totality of the circumstances”, rendering confession inadmissible

United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)

The 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, held that under the totality of the circumstances, including the eighteen-year-old defendant's intellectual disability, a confession that resulted from police questioning was involuntarily given and should not have been admitted at trial. In reaching this decision, the court overruled Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.1991) as well as subsequent cases relying on it, which had held that individual characteristics are “relevant to our due process inquiry only if we first conclude that the police's conduct was coercive.”

The court divided its initial inquiry into two categories—defendant’s reduced mental capacity and the techniques used during the interrogation. As to the first category, the court found that the intellectually impaired have a demonstrated increased vulnerability to coercion. The court also relied on scholarly assessment of common traits of intellectually disabled persons that may make them more susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques and then used those traits to inform their analysis of the techniques used to question the defendant, noting that “[A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, and away from physical coercion, courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the ‘voluntariness' calculus.”

The court based its totality of the circumstances inquiry into the coercive nature of the interrogation on several factors: (1) defendant's severe intellectual impairment, (2) repetitive questioning and the threats that questioning would continue without end, (3) pressure placed on the defendant to adopt certain responses, (4) the use of alternative questions that assumed defendant’s culpability, (5) the officers' multiple deceptions about how the statement would be used, (6) suggestive questioning that provided details of the alleged crime, and (7) false promises of leniency and confidentiality.

Found in DMHL Volume 34 Issue 1

Intellectual disability determination and the death penalty

Request to submit “newly discovered evidence” to establish intellectual disability and ineligibility for death penalty not barred by 28 U.S.C § 2255(e) even after original appeal denied

Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (rehearing en banc)

Bruce Webster was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death and related offenses and was sentenced to death. These convictions and his death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Texas, and his motions for habeas relief, which were heard in Indiana where he resides on death row, were denied. Webster sought a rehearing en banc to address the question of whether he could file for a writ of habeas corpus to present new evidence demonstrating that he was categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014). Federal prisoners who claim to be convicted or sentenced in violation of the Constitution must present a claim for relief by a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Subsection (e) generally prevents a prisoner from making an application for a writ of habeas corpus. There is, however, a savings clause in § 2255(e) that allows a prisoner to apply for a writ of habeas corpus where “it appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” A panel of the Seventh Circuit originally concluded that a claim of new evidence can never satisfy the standard in § 2255(e).

Upon rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit determined that “the savings clause [in § 2255(e)] permits Webster to resort to a [habeas] petition.” Of essential importance to the Court were the facts that “the Supreme Court has now established that the Constitution itself forbids the execution of certain people,” and that a “core purpose of habeas corpus is to prevent a custodian from inflicting an unconstitutional sentence.” The Court held that a categorical bar against the use of § 2255(e)’s savings clause in this way could lead to “the intolerable result of condoning an execution that violates the Eighth Amendment.” Conceding that this rule could not be applied to all newly discovered evidence due to finality considerations, the Court held that habeas relief was available to Webster because the new evidence proffered existed before the time of the trial and there was evidence “indicating that [it] was not available during the initial trial as a result of missteps by the Social Security Administration, not Webster’s counsel.”

Found in DMHL Volume 34 Issue 2

Intellectual disability determination and the death penalty

Habeas corpus relief granted to criminal defendant sentenced to death in state court system on grounds that he is ineligible for death penalty due to intellectual disability

Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2015)

Tommy Pruitt was charged with murder, attempted murder, and related offenses in Indiana state court, and was convicted and sentenced to death. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Pruitt sought federal habeas relief claiming that he was intellectually disabled and thus categorically ineligible for the death penalty. He also included several claims alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, including one based on their failure to investigate and present evidence at sentencing that Pruitt suffered from schizophrenia. 

The Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana Supreme Court’s “determination that Pruitt failed to demonstrate significantly subaverage intellectual functioning based on inconsistent test scores” was objectively unreasonable and contrary to the clear and convincing weight of evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court erred by relying on “inaccurate assumptions and select pieces of evidence” in its factual determination, weighing circumstantial evidence—such as Pruitt’s ability to fill out applications for employment and his other work and school history—as more indicative of his true intellectual ability than his many subaverage IQ test scores. The Court also noted that the state court record contained “unrebutted evidence that Pruitt satisfie[d] the adaptive behavior prong of intellectual disability.” The Seventh Circuit also held that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of Pruitt’s paranoid schizophrenia was “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial” to establish ineffective assistance. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for new penalty-phase proceedings.

Found in DMHL Volume 34 Issue 2

Death Penalty

Right of defendant convicted and sentenced to death prior to Atkins decision to seek review and determination of whether defendant has intellectual disability and is therefore precluded from death penalty under the Eighth Amendment

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (2015)

Petitioner Kevan Brumfield was convicted of murder in Louisiana and sentenced to death before the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). A subsequent Louisiana state Supreme Court case mandated an evidentiary hearing whenever a defendant provides facts sufficient to raise a reasonable ground to believe that he has an intellectual disability. See State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835 (La. 2002). Brumfield amended his state post-conviction petition to include an Atkins claim and sought an evidentiary hearing. The amended petition referenced evidence introduced at sentencing that Brumfield had an IQ of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been prescribed medications and treated in psychiatric hospitals as a child, had been identified as having a learning disability, and had been placed in special education classes. The trial court dismissed his post-conviction petition without holding an evidentiary hearing or granting funds to conduct additional investigation. Brumfield sought federal habeas relief.

The district court granted relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2), but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the state court decision was not “contrary to” and did not involve “an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” nor was it “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding as unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) the state trial court’s determinations that 1) Brumfield’s IQ score was inconsistent with a diagnosis of intellectual disability and 2) he presented no evidence of adaptive impairment. Although the record contained some contrary evidence, that evidence did not foreclose all reasonable doubt as to Brumfield’s intellectual disability. The facts raised at sentencing were sufficient to raise doubt concerning Brumfield’s impairments. The Supreme Court held that Brumfield had “cleared [§ 2254(d)’s] procedural hurdles” and so was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to show his intellectual disability.

Found in DMHL Volume 34 Issue 2

Intellectual Disability (ID) and the death penalty

Brumfield v. Cain, 2015 WL 9213235 (5th Cir. 2015)

Defendant Brumfield found intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty, under the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Atkins and Brumfield

Background: Kevan Brumfield was convicted of first-degree murder in 1995 and sentenced to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Brumfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, arguing that he was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The District Court held that the state courts had erred by failing to hold an Atkins hearing and granted Brumfield a writ of habeas corpus after holding such a hearing. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed without reaching the merits of the Atkins claim, holding that Brumfield had not satisfied the procedural requirements for habeas relief. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding that he did meet the requirements, and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to ascertain whether the District Court’s determination that Brumfield was intellectually disabled was clear error.

Holdings: On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court’s determination was not clearly erroneous because it was “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Although the State argued that prior assessments placed Brumfield consistently in the 70- 85 range,3 the Fifth Circuit noted that “no actual IQ scores…were reported anywhere in Brumfield’s records” and that tests provided only “descriptions of the ranges into which Brumfield’s scores fell”, and every expert witness before the district court “agreed that Brumfield’s scores satisfied the first prong of the intellectual disability test.” Additionally, the District Court found that Brumfield had significant conceptual limitations and “carefully explained its reasoning, identified the specific evidence it relied upon, and specifically credited the testimony of certain experts.” Where the court’s reasoning was so careful and its conclusions not implausible—even if it rejected the State’s equally coherent and plausible story—the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb or second-guess its findings. Although Brumfield was not formally diagnosed as intellectually disabled until after age 18, the district court found that the evidence produced showed this failure to diagnose was related to incentives in the school system not to identify students as intellectually disabled. Again, the district court pointed to specific evidence—Brumfield’s poor academic record, below grade reading comprehension, and etiological factors (e.g., low birth weight, family history of intellectual disability). The Fifth Circuit noted that these factors “certainly bolster[ed] the court’s conclusion that Brumfield’s intellectual disability manifested” before 18.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 34, Issue 4

Due process requirements for involuntary hospitalization

J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2015)

Florida’s statutory structure for involuntary commitment of persons with intellectual disability violates the 14th amendment, as it allows for indefinite commitment without periodic review

Background: Plaintiff-Appellant J.R., an intellectually disabled man with an IQ of 56, was charged with sexual battery and, after being found incompetent to stand trial, was admitted to non-secure residential services under F.S.A. § 393.11. He claimed that Florida’s involuntary commitment laws denied due process because they permitted the State to keep intellectually disabled people committed indefinitely without periodic review. When a person is admitted, the circuit court that first ordered the admission keeps jurisdiction over the order, and the person “may not be released except by order of the court.” The court, however, is “never required to review a continuing involuntary admission” (emphasis in original). Admitted persons may only challenge their support plans in administrative proceedings, but administrators cannot change or vacate the admission order or require release. Thus, the only means of securing release was by writ of habeas corpus.

Holding: The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida’s statutory scheme was facially unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to require periodic review of continued commitments “by a decision-maker with the duty to consider and the authority to order release.” Even if the statutory scheme did require administrative agencies to conduct period reviews, however, it would still be facially unconstitutional because the agency did not have the authority to order release nor was it required to petition the circuit court.

Notable Points:

The availability of habeas corpus does not provide constitutionally adequate process: The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1984), stated that “habeas corpus is not adequate in and of itself” and “can be at most a backstop.” The Court distinguished habeas from periodic review because habeas is only available if a petitioner seeks it.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 34, Issue 4

Sentencing of Defendants with Intellectual Disability and/or Psychiatric Issues

State v. Dabney, No. 42650-2014, 2016 WL 768121 (Idaho Feb. 29, 2016)

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) declined to reduce the sentence of defendant convicted of sexually abusing two children based upon the mitigating developmental and psychiatric circumstances, and (2) relinquished defendant to custody of Board of Correction when a suitable community-based placement could not be found.

Background: Darrien Dabney, a developmentally disabled 18-year-old, forcibly sodomized two 6-year-old boys with whose family he had been living for less than a month. He was indicted for two counts of lewd conduct and ultimately pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement: the State would dismiss the other count and would recommend a suspended sentence of 20 years (5 fixed and the remaining indeterminate), with Dabney to be committed to a secure residential center for mentally delayed adults. When the district court determined that no suitable community placement could be found, it relinquished jurisdiction over Dabney and remanded him to the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction. Dabney filed a motion asking for reconsideration of his sentence, and, finding that Dabney had not presented any new information in support of his motion, the lower court denied reconsideration of his sentence or relinquishment of jurisdiction.

Holdings: The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed (1) the defendant’s sentence, (2) the lower court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction, and (3) the lower court’s order denying the motion to reduce the sentence.

Notable Points:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in pronouncing its sentence or relinquishing jurisdiction over defendant: The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the trial court’s sentence was not unreasonable despite the mitigating evidence presented. Although mitigating circumstances included the defendant’s abusive upbringing, sexual abuse at age 10, and extensive psychiatric issues, the sentencing decision was not an abuse of discretion because it was based primarily on the need to protect the community. Because no suitable community placement existed, the court did not err when it eventually relinquished jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court had retained jurisdiction for a period of time following sentencing, but once it was determined that there was no appropriate community-based facility that could allow for treatment of the defendant, it was not unreasonable for it to relinquish its jurisdiction. This holding was supported by the fact that the defendant had “ample opportunity to provide evidence regarding placements to allay [the] court’s concerns, [but] he did not do so.”

Incarcerating defendant instead of placing him on probation is constitutional: The Supreme Court also held that the district court’s decision not to place Dabney on probation clearly did not violate any of his constitutional rights. Because Dabney had already been sentenced to prison—and the only issue before the court was whether the sentence would be suspended and Dabney would be placed on probation—he had no constitutional or inherent right to be released prior to the expiration of his prison term

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Mitigation Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Salazar v. State, No. SC13-1233, 2016 WL 636103 (Fla. Feb. 18, 2016)

In a first degree murder case in which the defendant received a death sentence, the failure of defense counsel to investigate and present mitigation, including evidence regarding the defendant’s traumatic childhood and low intellectual functioning, sufficiently “undermined” “confidence in the outcome” so as to warrant remand for new hearing.

Background: After a jury trial, Neil Salazar was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. Salazar appealed and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The basis of the appeal was that Salazar’s trial counsel was deficient and had failed to investigate his background and intellectual functioning and present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase.

Holdings: The Supreme Court of Florida denied Salazar’s habeas petition, but they remanded the case for a new penalty phase, holding that Salazar’s trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. The court held that Salazar had demonstrated both deficiency and prejudice in regard to his trial counsel’s performance at the penalty phase. Specifically, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if trial counsel had presented evidence regarding Salazar’s low IQ, adaptive deficits, head injury, and family history.

Notable Points:

Because the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further, counsel’s failure to do so was objectively unreasonable: Salazar’s trial counsel was deficient—an element of the ineffective assistance claim—in failing at the penalty phase to investigate Salazar’s background and intellectual functioning. Specifically, a psychologist’s report from the defendant’s preliminary evaluation had directly informed trial counsel of defendant’s mental health problems and possible brain damage. Given this information, it was objectively unreasonable for Salazar’s trial counsel not to investigate further.

Counsel’s failure resulted in prejudice at the penalty phase: The Supreme Court of Florida also held that Salazar had been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failures in the penalty phase. Considering the additional mitigation evidence relating to Salazar’s intellectual functioning, low IQ scores, adaptive deficits, childhood head injuries, and family history, there was a reasonable probability that hearing this additional evidence at the penalty phase would have led to a result other than the imposition of a death sentence.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty

Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2015), reh'g denied (Mar. 15, 2016)

Inability of defendant to show manifestation of intellectual disability before age 18 does not, alone, result in failure of Atkins claim; Hall v. Florida requires a court to analyze all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard, and requires a different legal analysis of the onset prior to age 18 prong than was undertaken by the trial court.

Background: Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., was tried and convicted of robbery and first-degree murder in 1979 and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 1994, he sought postconviction relief but was denied. Post-Atkins, he filed a motion to vacate his death sentence on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, concluding that Oats had not been able to establish that his intellectual disability had manifested prior to age 18 as required by Florida’s statutory test for determining intellectual disability.

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court reversed, giving three reasons for its decision. First, it noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida indicated that the lower court should have addressed all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard and not denied the claim based on the apparent failure to meet one of the prongs. Second, the Court held that the lower court failed to consider all of the testimony presented, including evidence from prior postconviction proceedings. Third, the Court found that the lower court erroneously conflated “manifested” with “diagnosed,” an error upon which it based its conclusion that Oats failed to establish his intellectual disability.

Notable Points:

Hall v. Florida requires a circuit court to address all three prongs of the intellectual disability test rather than finding one factor to be dispositive: One of the three prongs of the intellectuality disability test is manifestation of the condition before age 18, but that determination is not dispositive. The Florida Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the trial court not to consider all three prongs of the intellectual disability test, and to rely solely on the third prong of the test in denying Oats’s claim. The Court, however, was careful to say that, although this was reversible error here, failure to consider all three prongs should not constitute per se reversible error. Nonetheless, all three prongs must be considered because they are interdependent and, even when one is not satisfied, “a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other prongs.”

The circuit court erred in making its conclusion without weighing all testimony presented by defendant: The Florida Supreme Court also held that it was error for the circuit court not to consider all the testimony that Oats presented. The parties stipulated to consideration of the mental health evidence presented in a previous proceeding, and the circuit court did not require the parties to recall all witnesses who testified previously. In its decision, however, the circuit court stated that it was “not in a position to reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified or the evidence” considered in those prior proceedings and simply accepted the postconviction court’s ruling. The Florida Supreme Court held that the lower court should have permitted the parties to recall the witnesses in a new proceeding and submit evidence so that it could be considered and weighed.

Legal standard for analyzing whether intellectual disability manifested before age 18: The Florida Supreme Court noted that the manifestation prong is used to ensure there was evidence of intellectual disability during the developmental period, and that to require evidence of diagnosis before age 18 would render the first two prongs of the standard moot. The Court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Hall as demonstrative of how evidence of manifestation, without affirmative diagnosis, can lead to a clear finding that the prong was established.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Use of Expert Mental Health Testimony in Criminal Cases

United States v. West, No. 14-2514, 2015 WL 9487929 (7th Cir. Dec. 30, 2015)

In a case of illegal gun possession that rested almost exclusively on defendant’s replies to police questioning that the gun in question was his, testimony by an expert that the defendant’s admission was unreliable due his low IQ, mental illness and high suggestibility should not be excluded.

Background: Antonio West was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The gun was found in the attic of the family home during a consensual search for a stolen television. No fingerprints were recovered from the gun, and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether West actually lived in the home in which the gun was found. As such, the case for possession rested on West’s admission to police that the gun was his. West’s attorney moved to suppress his statements to police based on expert testimony that West had a low IQ, suffered from mental illness, and scored highly on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale. The district court denied the motion, finding that West had competently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. West’s attorney then moved to admit the expert testimony at trial to (1) assist the jury in assessing the reliability of the confession, (2) negate the intent element of the offense, and (3) explain West’s demeanor should he testify. The judge excluded the evidence on all three grounds and the jury found West guilty.

Holding: On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for a new trial. The Court agreed with West that the exclusion of expert testimony regarding West’s IQ was reversible error. Because the government’s case relied heavily on the jury’s acceptance of West’s confession, the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony regarding the potential reliability of that confession could not have been harmless error.

Notable Points: 

The expert’s testimony regarding West’s IQ was relevant to the question of the reliability of the confession: The Seventh Circuit held that expert testimony explaining that a defendant’s low IQ and mental illness could have influenced his responses to officers’ questions was certainly relevant and admissible where the major issue at trial was the reliability of the defendant’s confession. The expert testimony was highly relevant to the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s personal characteristics, and the government’s objection to the testimony went properly to its weight, not admissibility.

Erroneous exclusion of expert testimony warranted a new trial: Because the government’s case depended on whether the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm as a felon, and that determination rested largely on the defendant’s confession, the expert should have been allowed to testify. If he had, the jury might have discounted the defendant’s statement admitting that the gun was his. Given that, a new trial was required.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Intellectual Disability and Death Penalty

White v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000791-MR, 2016 WL 2604759 (Ky. May 5, 2016)

Kentucky Supreme Court overturns trial court ruling that defendant waived claim that he was not subject to the death penalty due to intellectual disability after defendant had refused to accept evaluation by a state psychiatric center to determine intellectual disability and insisted on state payment for evaluation by a private psychologist.

Background: In 1980, White was convicted by a Powell Circuit Court jury of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. He was sentenced to death for each of the three murders. Less than a month after he was sentenced, White was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which determined that he had an overall IQ score of 81. In 2004, White filed a motion in the Powell Circuit Court, based on Atkins v. Virginia, to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. White argued that the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) was incapable of conducting the necessary evaluations to determine his competence for the death penalty, and that the state should instead pay for an independent evaluation by an intellectual disability expert selected by White. Over the next several years, several orders for evaluation by the trial court and subsequent writs of prohibition by both White and the Commonwealth were entered. The trial court ultimately rejected White’s demand for an independent evaluation and ordered an evaluation by the KCPC. White refused to cooperate with the evaluation by the KCPC, which the trial court ruled was a waiver of his intellectual disability claim.

Holding: On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that White is not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment that White waived his right to an intellectual disability claim by refusing an evaluation by the KCPC.

Notable Points:

An evaluation by the KCPC does not violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during post-conviction proceedings: The court ruled that White’s Fifth Amendment rights would be minimally affected, if at all, by an evaluation by the KCPC. White was already tried and convicted of three murders; therefore, any inquiry by the mental health professionals into these crimes would not implicate the right.

Kentucky law barring executions of only those individuals with an IQ score of 70 or less was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014): The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the Hall decision “effectively invalidated our arbitrary intelligence score standard for evaluating” intellectual disability.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Intellectual Disability and Death Penalty

Hall v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 372 (2016)

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Florida, Florida Supreme Court finds that Hall meets the clinical, statutory, and constitutional requirements to establish that Hall’s intellectual disability precludes his being executed for the murders he committed.

Background: Freddie Lee Hall was convicted of murder in 1978 and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in 1981. After numerous appeals, Hall’s case received cert to the U.S. Supreme Court on a claim that Florida’s requirement that an inmate show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a determination of Hall’s intellectual disability. 

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court found that despite Hall’s IQ test scores above 70, he met the clinical definition of intellectually disabled based on evidence of organic brain damage, mental illness, and records indicating low intellectual ability. The court reversed the order of the circuit court denying post-conviction relief, vacated Hall’s death sentence, and imposed a life sentence.

Notable Point:

Age of onset for intellectual disability: The court reiterated that Florida statute requires only that intellectual disability be demonstrated to have manifested prior to age 18, not that it be diagnosed prior to age 18.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Mental Health Services

L.J. v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-16139, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16201 (9th Cir. Sep. 1, 2016)

Ninth Circuit rules that a student was eligible for special education services based on prior psychiatric hospitalizations and suicide attempts even though those incidents occurred outside the school environment, and directs that an individualized education plan be developed for the student despite findings that the student was performing well at school.

Background: L.J. was a primary school student exhibiting behavioral problems in grades two through five. L.J.’s mother repeatedly requested that the school district find L.J. eligible for special education under the IDEA, but the requests were denied. Through mediation, the school district agreed to transfer L.J. to another school, provide one-onone counseling through a paraeducator, and provide an assessment by a school psychologist. Despite the services provided, L.J. continued to act out violently and made two suicide attempts resulting in his confinement to a psychiatric hospital, which caused him to miss six school days. L.J.’s mother filed a request for a due process hearing claiming the school district failed to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) by denying L.J special education services and that the district failed to make requested records relating to L.J.’s counseling available. An administrative law judge ruled that L.J. did not have any qualifying disabilities and even if he had such qualifying disabilities, L.J. was not eligible for special education services because his academic performance was satisfactory when he was able to attend school. On appeal, the district court ruled that L.J. had qualifying disabilities, but did not need special education services because of his satisfactory academic performance. 

Holding: The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the student was eligible for special education services. The court ruled that the student exhibited a need for services because his improved performance was due to his receipt of special education services, and that the student's psychiatric hospitalizations and suicide attempts were relevant to his eligibility for specialized instruction even though they occurred outside the school environment. The court also held that the school district committed procedural violations of the IDEA by failing to disclose school records and failing to conduct a health assessment.

Notable Point:

Qualifications for special education services: The court explained that a student with qualifying disabilities is nonetheless ineligible for special education services if support provided through general education services is sufficient to address the needs of the student. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the lower courts mischaracterized the specialized services L.J. was receiving as falling under general education services.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability

Thompson v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 510 (2016)

Florida Supreme Court reaffirms the rejection of a bright-line IQ cutoff of 70 in determining eligibility for the death penalty and holds it would be a manifest injustice not to give a defendant the benefit of the three-pronged test set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall.

Background: William Lee Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for a 1976 murder committed when Thompson was 24 years old. His sentence became final in 1993. Thompson filed numerous post-conviction motions claiming he is ineligible for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. Thompson’s IQ was measured by multiple experts with estimates ranging from 71–88. Thompson’s most recent post-Hall motion was denied by the circuit court because his IQ scores were generally over 80 and Hall only required courts to consider IQ scores 75 and below.

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing regarding Thompson’s intellectual disability. In reaching its decision, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a bright-line IQ cutoff for intellectual disability and directed lower courts to apply all three prongs of the Hall test rather than relying on any one prong as dispositive.

Notable Point:

Retroactive Effect of Hall: In a short dissent two justices reject the idea that Hall should apply retroactively and would therefore have denied Thompson relief.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4