Involuntary Commitment; Constitutional Due Process

In re the Det. of M.W. & W.D. v. Dep’t Soc. & Health Serv., Washington, W. State Hosp., No. 90570-3, 2016 WL 3249495 (Wash. June 9, 2016) (en banc)

Washington Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of state statutory provisions authorizing commitment and re-commitment of individuals with mental illness on the grounds that they were charged with violent felonies and continued to present substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts, even after original charges dismissed on the grounds that the individuals were unrestorably incompetent to stand trial.

Background: The respondents' cases were unrelated but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of involuntary recommitment. M.W. and W.D. were both charged with violent felonies and had their charges dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. In each case, the court ordered mental health evaluations to determine if they should be involuntarily committed, and each man was committed for 180 days of involuntary treatment. Prior to the expiration of the men’s commitments, the State utilized a new procedure for recommitting a person based on a judge’s finding that the person committed a violent felony. The new procedure allowed for recommitment in some circumstances based on a preliminary hearing, rather than a full evidentiary hearing, to determine whether “the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder or developmental disability that results in a substantial likelihood of committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.” The individual would then have the opportunity to rebut any findings through admissible expert testimony. The superior court commissioner declared the former statute unconstitutional and ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds.

Holding: On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the procedure for involuntary commitment did not violate substantive or procedural due process, vagueness or equal protection. The court also ruled that the statute did not violate an individual’s right to a jury trial because the periods of commitment are short and the state has a high burden of proof for recommitment. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court and upheld the statute at issue as constitutional.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Treatment over Objection to Restore Defendant to Competency to Stand Trial

U.S. v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2016)

Ninth Circuit vacates and remands district court order authorizing treatment, finding government failed to show proposed treatment is in the defendant’s best medical interests.

Background: From 2004 to 2012, Onuoha served in the National Guard. From 2006 to September 2013, when he resigned, Onuoha worked as a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screener at LAX Airport. A few hours after resigning, Onuoha returned to TSA headquarters at LAX and left a note for a former supervisor who had been involved in a suspension of Onuoha earlier that summer. The government alleged that Onuoha then made calls to a TSA checkpoint and to the LAX police department alluding to sending a message to America and the world and telling them to evacuate LAX. TSA headquarters was evacuated. Law enforcement officials went to Onuoha’s apartment and discovered that all of his belongings had been removed and all that remained was a large note reading “09/11/2013 THERE WILL BE FIRE! FEAR! FEAR! FEAR!” Later that day, Onuoha called LAX police and told them that he was at a church in Riverside, CA. He told police that he did not intend to make a bomb threat or injure anyone and that he only wanted to deliver a message. Onuoha waited at the church until he was apprehended.

Onuoha’s defense counsel submitted a report that Onuoha suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and planned to raise a diminished-capacity defense. The government requested a competency evaluation, and Onuoha was found not competent to stand trial. The government then filed a motion for an order to involuntarily medicate Onuoha with the goal of restoring him to competency, which the district court granted.

Holding: On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred in finding that the proposed treatment was in Onuoha’s best medical interest under the Sell test. The court of appeals held that the district court was correct in finding that there is an important government interest at stake in prosecuting Onuoha, but the district court clearly erred in finding that the proposed course of treatment was in Onuoha’s best medical interests.

Notable Points:

The seriousness of the offense outweighed the “special circumstance” of time detained: The first Sell factor requires the government to prove that important governmental interests are at stake in prosecuting Onuoha. In Sell, the court recognized that there may be some special circumstances that diminish the government’s interest in prosecution, including the amount of time the defendant had already been confined. In this case, the court considered that Onuoha had already spent time in custody since September 2013, amounting to confinement beyond the minimum possible sentence. Nevertheless, the court found it important that a conviction and resulting sentence for the serious crime at issue is significant in terms of general deterrence, not just incapacitation of a specific individual. Here, the court concluded that the government’s valid interest in prosecuting Onuoha outweighed any special circumstances of Onuoha’s detention.

The government did not meet its burden for proving the fourth Sell factor by clear and convincing evidence: The fourth Sell factor requires the government to prove that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate and therefore in Onuoha’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition. The Ninth Circuit held that after hearing the testimony of a medical expert experienced in administering involuntary medication, the district court could not credit the expert’s testimony without exploring contradictory evidence in the record. In this case, contradictory evidence included that the recommended treatment increased the risk of side effects, the dosage proposed was higher than is generally recommended, and the use of the proposed drug does not conform to the community standard of care. Because involuntary medication orders are disfavored in light of the significant liberty interests at stake, and because the record demonstrated that the proposed treatment included dosages higher than generally recommended, the medication was not in Onuoha’s best medical interest.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Competency Evaluations

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Soc. and Health Services, 822 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2016)

The Ninth Circuit finds that 7-day deadline for competence to stand trial evaluations is not constitutionally required and, therefore, the lower court’s permanent injunction required modification.

Background: In Washington, if a judge, defense attorney, or prosecutor raises a doubt about a criminal defendant’s competency, the court must order an evaluation. If the defendant is found incompetent, the court may order restorative services, dismiss the case, or refer the defendant for civil commitment. Washington law, as of July 2015, set a target deadline of 7 days or less for the state to complete a competency evaluation, with the option to extend the deadline to 14 days for clinical reasons and several defenses for failing to meet the deadline. Cassie Trueblood brought a Section 1983 claim on behalf of a plaintiff who was found legally incompetent to stand trial and detained in solitary confinement awaiting transfer to a hospital and the class of past and future detainees. Trueblood claimed that the current waiting times in jail for competency evaluations were so long that they were “beyond any constitutional boundary.” The district court granted Trueblood’s motion for summary judgment, stating that any waiting period beyond 7 days is suspect of infringing the detainee’s liberty interest in freedom from incarceration. The court also ordered a permanent injunction because it found that the state “‘had a long history of failing to adequately protect the constitutional rights’ of the class and had ‘demonstrated a consistent pattern of intentionally disregarding court orders.’” The state appealed only the part of the injunction that required a competency evaluation within 7 days, or longer upon a court-ordered extension for “clinical good cause.”

Holding: According to previous Supreme Court decisions, the length of the commitment must have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the commitment and the interests of the detainee and state must be weighed in light of constitutionally acceptable timeframes. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the circumstances of pretrial detainees and their confinement. When the constitutionality of competency evaluation deadlines is challenged, a court must weigh the interests of the detainees and the state and benchmark those interests against what is constitutionally reasonable, not simply decide whether the deadlines are reasonable and achievable. The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court made no such analysis and erroneously based its findings on what was reasonable and achievable. The Ninth Circuit held that, for this reason, the lower court erred in upholding the 7 day deadline and, thus, that part of the permanent injunction was vacated and the case was remanded to the lower court. The Ninth Circuit charged the lower court with modifying the permanent injunction while “taking into account the balancing of interests related specifically to initial competency evaluations.”

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Treatment over Objection to Restore Defendant to Competency to Stand Trial

United States v. Sheikh, No. 15-4616, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9920 (4th Cir. June 1, 2016)

Fourth Circuit upholds district court order authorizing treatment. [Editor’s Note: This is an unpublished opinion and, thus, is not binding precedent. It is included because it is an instructive case regarding fact-finding under Sell and United States v. Watson, 793 F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 2015). DMHL previously covered Watson in Volume 34, Issue 3.]

Background: The United States charged Basit Javed Sheikh with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B after his alleged attempt to join al-Nusrah Front, a foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State as an alias for al-Qa’ida. The district court concluded that Sheikh was incompetent to stand trial after two pretrial competency examinations, and ordered him hospitalized for attempted competency restoration. Sheikh refused to cooperate with treatment, and the United States moved for permission to involuntarily medicate him based on his psychiatric evaluation. At the Sell hearing, three medical experts testified and the district court determined that involuntary medication was appropriate. The order was stayed pending Sheikh’s anticipated interlocutory appeal.

Holding: The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had properly applied the four-part test established by Sell, and had adequately explained its findings. The court found that involuntary medication of the defendant would significantly further the United States’ prosecution interests without a substantial likelihood of producing side effects that would interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a defense.

Notable Points:

The possibility of civil commitment did not sufficiently mitigate the United States’ prosecutorial interest to preclude involuntary medication: The first Sell factor weighs the government’s interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a “serious” crime. Fourth Circuit precedent has recognized that a crime carrying a statutory maximum of ten years or more qualifies as “serious” within the Sell context—the crime of which Sheikh was accused carried a statutory maximum of fifteen years. Despite this strong prosecutorial interest, Sheikh contended that the district court had erred by failing to find the possibility of his civil commitment to be a special circumstance sufficient to negate the United States’ prosecutorial interests (see U.S. v. Onuoha below, which discusses special circumstances as well). Sheikh argued that the likelihood of his civil commitment mitigated (and negated) the government’s prosecutorial interest because they “need not be concerned that he will be released to the public” even in the absence of a conviction.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed. Although the district court did weigh the possibility of civil commitment, it found that, particularly given the nature of the charges against Sheikh, that possibility did not negate the government’s prosecutorial interests. Stating that “not every serious crime is equally serious,” the Fourth Circuit found that the government’s interest in combating terrorism is “an urgent objective of the highest order” and that the relevant criminal statute (§ 2339B) represents the “considered judgment of Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization—even seemingly benign support— bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization.” Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that although the possibility of civil commitment mitigates one aspect of the government’s prosecutorial interest (i.e., ensuring Sheikh will not be released into the community), it did not address the additional prosecutorial interest of general deterrence that is achieved when “a person is convicted of a serious crime, thus deterring others from making the same mistake.”

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2