Competence to enter into plea agreement

District court abused its discretion in not sua sponte ordering competency evaluation based upon medical evidence of incompetence introduced for the defendant’s sentencing hearing

U.S. v. Wingo, 2015 WL 3698157 (11th Cir. 2015)

Andrew Wingo was a defendant in a complex securities fraud case, and was represented by counsel. Wingo made only brief appearances before the court, and ultimately entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to just one of the numerous charges against him. Some evidence of Wingo’s health concerns came to light during early proceedings (e.g., bond revocation hearing), but neither his attorney nor the government raised any concerns about Wingo’s competence at the plea hearing. The issue of Wingo’s mental capacity was not raised until the sentencing phase approximately six months later, when Wingo’s attorney requested a reduced sentence based upon diagnoses of dementia and other cognitive impairments. The pre-sentence report from the government also noted Wingo’s cognitive impairments. The court at sentencing noted the medical information submitted regarding Wingo’s condition, but determined that this should not affect the length of sentence. Wingo appealed, arguing that the court had both a statutory and a constitutional duty to order a competency hearing sua sponte because there was reasonable cause to doubt his competence.

The Eleventh Circuit noted that in a prior case (Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (1990)) it had identified three factors to be considered in determining whether information establishes a “bona fide doubt regarding the defendant's competence.” After a detailed review of the evidence submitted prior to the sentencing hearing, the Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient to create “reasonable cause to believe that Wingo was incompetent to proceed to trial or to plead guilty.” It found that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing, and remanded the case to the district court to determine “whether Wingo's competency can be evaluated nunc pro tunc, and if so, for an assessment of his competency at the time of his guilty plea and sentencing.” The Eleventh Circuit stated that if such evaluation were to find Wingo was incompetent at the time of the plea agreement, or if such evaluation is not possible, Wingo's conviction and sentence must be vacated, with the government having the right to try him if he becomes competent. If the evaluation were to find Wingo was competent, his conviction and sentence must be affirmed.

Found in DMHL Volume 34 Issue 2

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Morris v. Carpenter, 802 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2015)

Granting of habeas relief and finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in sentencing phase vacated by Circuit Court

Background: Following affirmance of his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated rape and the imposition of a capital sentence, Farris Morris sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Specifically, Morris argued that his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental illness or to use a mitigation specialist at the penalty phase. The District Court granted his petition and vacated his sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of Morris’s trial. The Warden appealed.

Holding: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s grant of habeas relief. The Court held that Morris’s trial counsel’s failure to present additional mentalhealth testimony as mitigation evidence at sentencing did not render counsel’s performance deficient. Unlike the counsel in Saranchak and Hardwick, the Sixth Circuit found that Morris’s trial counsel had a legitimate strategy reason for not presenting additional mental health testimony in the penalty phase—the additional evidence could have opened the door to “rebuttal evidence of Morris’s history of drug dealing, drug use, and other illegal acts.” This risk of damaging rebuttal evidence made defense counsel’s decision to avoid presenting additional mental health evidence reasonable and not constitutionally deficient.

Notable Points:

Reasonable refusal to introduce additional mental health evidence: Counsel presented testimony at the guilt phase “to show how cocaine intoxication and withdrawal can affect the user’s ability to reason.” Although, the defense team did not present new expert testimony at sentencing, they consulted with mental-health experts to form their strategy, and expert testimony was already before the jury. Additionally, mitigation witnesses testified about “Morris’s character, work habits, and good behavior in prison.”

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 34, Issue 4

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Hardwick v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 803 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2015)

Failure of defense counsel to present mitigation evidence regarding defendant’s history of mental illness in sentencing phase of murder trial was prejudicial

Background: After affirmance of his state murder conviction and death sentence and denial of state post-conviction relief, John Gary Hardwick, Jr. petitioned for federal habeas relief. Hardwick based his claim of ineffective assistance on his counsel’s failure to conduct a professionally reasonable mitigation investigation regarding his mental health during the penalty phase, and that it was reasonably probable that he would not have been sentenced to death but for this deficient performance. After an initial denial followed by remand and an evidentiary hearing, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida determined that Hardwick’s counsel had been ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial and set aside his capital sentence.

Holdings: The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Hardwick was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his capital sentence and requiring the imposition of a life sentence, unless the State provided him with a new penalty phase. Although trial counsel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is not per se ineffective assistance, the strategic choice not to present mitigating evidence must be objectively reasonable. Here, as in Saranchak, there were several “red flags” that should have signaled to counsel the need to conduct a life-history investigation, to interview family members, and provide the information to a mental health expert.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 34, Issue 4

Sentencing of Defendants with Intellectual Disability and/or Psychiatric Issues

State v. Dabney, No. 42650-2014, 2016 WL 768121 (Idaho Feb. 29, 2016)

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) declined to reduce the sentence of defendant convicted of sexually abusing two children based upon the mitigating developmental and psychiatric circumstances, and (2) relinquished defendant to custody of Board of Correction when a suitable community-based placement could not be found.

Background: Darrien Dabney, a developmentally disabled 18-year-old, forcibly sodomized two 6-year-old boys with whose family he had been living for less than a month. He was indicted for two counts of lewd conduct and ultimately pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement: the State would dismiss the other count and would recommend a suspended sentence of 20 years (5 fixed and the remaining indeterminate), with Dabney to be committed to a secure residential center for mentally delayed adults. When the district court determined that no suitable community placement could be found, it relinquished jurisdiction over Dabney and remanded him to the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction. Dabney filed a motion asking for reconsideration of his sentence, and, finding that Dabney had not presented any new information in support of his motion, the lower court denied reconsideration of his sentence or relinquishment of jurisdiction.

Holdings: The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed (1) the defendant’s sentence, (2) the lower court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction, and (3) the lower court’s order denying the motion to reduce the sentence.

Notable Points:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in pronouncing its sentence or relinquishing jurisdiction over defendant: The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the trial court’s sentence was not unreasonable despite the mitigating evidence presented. Although mitigating circumstances included the defendant’s abusive upbringing, sexual abuse at age 10, and extensive psychiatric issues, the sentencing decision was not an abuse of discretion because it was based primarily on the need to protect the community. Because no suitable community placement existed, the court did not err when it eventually relinquished jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court had retained jurisdiction for a period of time following sentencing, but once it was determined that there was no appropriate community-based facility that could allow for treatment of the defendant, it was not unreasonable for it to relinquish its jurisdiction. This holding was supported by the fact that the defendant had “ample opportunity to provide evidence regarding placements to allay [the] court’s concerns, [but] he did not do so.”

Incarcerating defendant instead of placing him on probation is constitutional: The Supreme Court also held that the district court’s decision not to place Dabney on probation clearly did not violate any of his constitutional rights. Because Dabney had already been sentenced to prison—and the only issue before the court was whether the sentence would be suspended and Dabney would be placed on probation—he had no constitutional or inherent right to be released prior to the expiration of his prison term

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc., 812 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2016)

Section 504 authorizes employment discrimination suits by independent contractors.

Background: After Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in 1990, the Senate Subcommittee on Disability Policy held a hearing out of concern over potential inconsistences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. In response to the “need to include the philosophies embodied in the ADA in the Rehabilitation Act,” Congress added subsection (d) to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Subsection (d) incorporated by reference parts of the ADA, for example: the standards used to determine whether Section 504 has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination “shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” Most federal circuit and district courts agree that, under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff may sue a defendant only if the plaintiff is an employee, not an independent contractor. In Flynn, the central question was whether Section 504(d) incorporated this limitation. The district court held that it did, and thus Flynn—an independent contractor with Distinctive Healthcare staffing—could not proceed with her employment discrimination claims.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and concluded that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act authorizes employment discrimination suits by independent contractors. 

Notable Points: 

The Rehabilitation Act adopts only the substantive standards of Title I of the ADA, not the definition of who is covered under the Rehabilitation Act: The Fifth Circuit held that Section 504(d) of the Rehabilitation Act does not incorporate Title I of the ADA in its entirety. Specifically, the Rehabilitation Act uses the ADA’s standards only to determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated. The Rehabilitation Act does not, however, state that the ADA standards determine whether an employer is subject to the Rehabilitation Act. The Court held that the definition of “employer” under the Rehabilitation Act is “far broader” and covers “all of the operations of covered entities, not only those related to employment.” Thus, the Rehabilitation Act adopts only the substantive standards for determining “what conduct violates the Rehabilitation Act, not the definition of who is covered” (emphasis in original).

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Criminal Sentencing

United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 22, 2016)

Conditions of supervised release were procedurally unreasonable because they were vague and lacked explanation.

Background: After pleading guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography, Matthew Poulin was sentenced to two concurrent 115-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent life terms of supervised release. Poulin appealed, contending that the district court had erred by not providing reasons for imposing the maximum term of supervised released and that the record lacked justification for the imposition of special conditions (including the requirement of mental health treatment). The Seventh Circuit vacated the original sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. On remand, the district court resentenced Poulin to concurrent 84-month terms of imprisonment and a 10-year term of supervised release, including nine standard conditions and seven special conditions. Poulin brought a successive appeal challenging several of the conditions.

Holdings: The Seventh Circuit again vacated the standard conditions of supervised release imposed below, basing its reasoning largely on a line of cases decided after the district court had issued its resentencing judgment. While acknowledging that the district court did not “have the benefit of guidance provided by [the more recent cases],” the Court held that the disputed conditions were not “properly-noticed, supported by adequate findings, and well-tailored to serve the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public” (citing United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015).

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Criminal Sentencing

United States v. Garcia, No. 15-40252, 2016 WL 386141 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016) (per curiam)

Special condition of sentence requiring mental health treatment under supervised release agreements failed to meet statutory standards for probation conditions.

Background: After receiving a sentence from the trial court that included a requirement to participate in a mental health treatment program, Ruben Garcia appealed his sentence to the Fifth Circuit. Garcia contended that the district court had committed reversible error by failing to explain “how the mental health condition was reasonably related to the pertinent statutory factors.” Additionally, he argued that the record did not justify an inference that such a condition was reasonable.

Holding: Because Garcia did not challenge the mental health condition in the trial court, the appellate court’s review was limited to plain error. Even under this standard, the Fifth Circuit vacated the condition of Garcia’s supervised release that required him to participate in mental health treatment, and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration. According to the Fifth Circuit, the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain how the special condition (i.e. mental health treatment) was reasonably related to all statutory factors. Without any clear explanation for the imposition of a special condition and a lack of implied justification in the record, the Fifth Circuit held that it was “incumbent upon [them] to vacate [the judgment below].” Because it was not obvious from the record that there was a basis for the mental health condition (and because such a condition affects Garcia’s substantial rights), the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court had committed plain error.

Found in Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 1

Sentencing of Persons with Mental Illness

United States v. Kluball, 843 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2016)

Seventh Circuit holds a defendant’s history of mental illness and ineffective treatment can be considered by the sentencing judge as a prediction of the potential for future misconduct without violating the defendant’s due process rights when reasonably based on factually accurate information.

Background: Alexander Klubal pled guilty and was sentenced to 10-years confinement for transporting a 17-year-old girl across state lines to engage in prostitution. A presentence report detailed Kluball’s history of mental illness, which included diagnoses of oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression. Klubal had received counseling, was hospitalized several times, and was treated with drugs including Adderall, Depakote, Eskalith, Fluoxetine, lithium, Prozac, Remeron, Ritalin, Seroquel, Strattera, Valium, Zoloft, Zydis, and Zyprexa. None of the treatments succeeded or lasted very long. During sentencing, the judge remarked that Kluball’s history of mental illness did not alleviate any responsibility for his crimes and suggested that mental health treatment would not have a lasting impact on his ability refrain from engaging in criminal conduct in the future. The judge then sentenced Kluball to the statutory maximum of 10 years. Kluball appealed the sentence, challenging the judge’s assertion that treatment would not have a lasting impact on his conduct as a violation of his due process rights.

Holding: The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 10-year sentence finding no violation of due process.

Notable Point:

Sentencing: The Seventh Circuit explained that during sentencing judges are routinely required to make predictions about a defendant’s future conduct and response to treatment. The court explained that such predictions do not violate due process when they are based on accurate information rather than unsupported speculation. The court was satisfied that Kluball’s history of mental illness and response to past treatment was factually accurate and sufficient to support the judge’s predictions about Kluball’s future conduct.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4