Ruling Striking Down Federal Policy to Revoke Prescription Privileges for Recommending Medical Marijuana Not Disturbed

Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Walters v. Conant, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review of ruling of the Ninth Circuit that held that a federal policy that threatened to revoke a physician's authority to prescribe controlled substances if the physician recommended the use of medical marijuana to a patient violated the First Amendment...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Suspension of Medical Student Not Disturbed

Ku v. Tennessee, 322 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 325 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Sixth Circuit that upheld the suspension of a medical student at a state university for what the student claimed was a suspected behavioral or psychological disorder.  The Sixth Circuit held that due process was satisfied when the student was fully informed of the faculty's dissatisfaction with the student's academic progress and when the decision to suspend had been careful and deliberate...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Refusal to Grant "Parental Immunity" to Residential Child Care Facility Not Disturbed

Wallace v. Smyth, 786 N.E.2d 980 (111. 2002), cert. denied, Maryville Academy v. Wallace, 124 S. Ct. 43 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court that refused to grant immunity from liability to a residential child care facility and its employees.  The facility and seven of its employees were sued when a 12-year-old boy who had been placed in their care for a 90- day diagnostic assessment died.  After being placed in restraint for more than four hours, the boy died from positional asphyxia....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that State Settlement of Tobacco Litigation Satisfies Liens Against Medicaid Recipient's Estate for Health Care Costs Related to Smoking Not Disturbed

In re Raduazo, 814 A.2d 147 (N.H. 2002), cert. denied, New Hampshire Dep't of Health and Human Services v. Estate of Raduazo, 123 S. Ct. 2610 (2003); 12(26) BNA's Health Law Reporter 1020 (June 26, 2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling that New Hampshire's tobacco litigation settlement with major tobacco companies barred it from also recovering Medicaid expenditures from the estate of a woman who died from smoking-related causes.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the settlement, in which a number of states agreed to release tobacco companies from further claims in exchange for a stream of payments, satisfied New Hampshire's
$169,765.16 lien against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The New Hampshire Supreme Court was not swayed by a series of rulings that have rejected attempts by individual smokers to obtain access to the tobacco settlement fund. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the payments made pursuant to the tobacco settlement were made, in part, to reimburse the state for the health care costs it paid through the Medicaid program on behalf of individuals such as this woman and to allow the state to also collect for these expenses from the woman's estate would unjustly enable the state to collect the money to which it is entitled twice...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Civil Rights Claim Can Be Pursued Against Police Officer for Failure to Inform Jail Officials Inmate on Verge of Attempti ng Suicide Not Disturbed

Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Shepard v. Cavalieri, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Seventh Circuit that the mother of a jail inmate was entitled to pursue a civil rights claim against a police officer for his alleged failure to inform jail officials that her son was on the verge of trying to commit suicide.  The Seventh Circuit rejected the officer's argument that his duty to inform ended when the pretrial detainee was transferred from municipal to county custody....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that 12-Year-Ol d Boy Could Be Subject to Life-Long Sex Offender Registration and Be Required to Move from His Home Town Not Disturbed

In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 222 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for aggravated criminal sexual assault could be required to register and report for the rest of his life as a sex offender and could be prohibited from residing in his home town.  The juvenile was a 12-year-old boy who had been sentenced to a term of five years' probation following his admission of having sexual contact with two 7- year-old boys a number of times.  He was required to reside with his aunt and would be allowed to reside with his parents only if they moved to another town.  The juvenile had argued in part that subjecting him to the registration requirement was inconsistent with the purposes and policies underlying the Illinois Juvenile Court Act...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Woman Can Be Convicted of "Homicide by Child Abuse" for Causing Stillbirth of Viable Fetus by Using Cocaine Not Disturbed

State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied, McKnight v. South Carolina, 124 S. Ct. 101 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling by the South Carolina Supreme Court that a woman could be convicted of the crime of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to 20 years in prison for causing the stillbirth of her viable fetus by using cocaine.  The South Carolina court held that the statute defining the crime of homicide by child abuse could be applied to stillbirths based on prior holdings that the legislature's use of the word "child" encompassed a viable fetus.  In light of common knowledge that cocaine use during pregnancy can harm a fetus, the court determined the statute provided sufficient notice that it could be applied to a woman whose fetus is stillborn.  The court also found that the application of the statute here did not violate constitutional rights of privacy and autonomy, that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense, and that taking a urine sample from the defendant in the hospital did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Defendant Found Incompetent to Stand Trial Must Initially Be Hospitalized, Even if Unlikely to Be Restored to Competence, Not Disturbed

United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Ferro v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 296 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Eighth Circuit that joined the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that an initial period of hospitalization is mandatory for a criminal defendant in the federal system who has been found incompetent to stand trial, even when the evidence shows he is unlikely to be restored to competence.  The Eighth Circuit ruled the trial court did not have the discretion, prior to a reasonable period of hospitalization, to determine whether the defendant will likely attain the capacity to stand trial.  The court determined hospitalization permitted a more careful and accurate diagnosis; the limited length of the hospitalization, a maximum of four months, minimized the potential harm to the defendant; and the "miracles of science suggest that few conditions are truly without the possibility of improvement."...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Alcoholism and Intoxication Do Not Require Special Capital Sentencing Jury Instruction Identifying Them as Mitigating Factors Not Disturbed

Harris v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1576 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a Fifth Circuit ruling that upheld the capital sentence of a Texas man.  The defendant argued in part that the trial court was required to identify alcoholism or evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense as mitigating factors during the sentencing hearing. The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither constituted a "uniquely severe permanent handicap[ ] with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own," which would have required a special jury instruction under the Supreme Court's opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989). The Fifth Circuit also determined the jury was able to give mitigating effect to evidence of the defendant's alcoholism under jury instructions pertaining to deliberateness and future dangerousness and to evidence of the defendant's intoxication through the instruction on deliberateness...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Death Sentence: Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Defendant's Social History/Mental Health, Even Though Defendant Not Forthcoming and Opposed Investigation, Not Disturbed

Woodford v. Douglas, 316 F.3d 1079 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 49 (2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a Ninth Circuit ruling that a capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when counsel failed to adequately investigate defendant's social history and mental health for information that could have been used as mitigating evidence at sentencing.  The defendant thus was entitled to have his death sentence vacated even though he had not been forthcoming with information about his social history and was opposed to an investigation of his mental health.  The Ninth Circuit ruled trial counsel had a duty to investigate a defendant's mental state if there was evidence to suggest, as was the case here, that the defendant was impaired and this duty was not absolved by the defendant's refusal to cooperate when there was a significant and readily discoverable alternative source of information available....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Death Sentence Because Counsel Failed to Investigate and Present Defendant's Childhood Abuse as Mitigating Evidence Not Disturbed

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Woodford v. Karis, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 3795 (July 1, 2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review the ruling of the Ninth Circuit that overturned the imposition of the death penalty for ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because defendant's attorney failed to thoroughly investigate and present during the sentencing phase substantial mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's childhood history.  This evidence included abuse inflicted upon the defendant and his mother by his father and stepfather. Notwithstanding the family's denial of and reluctance to discuss this abuse, the Ninth Circuit said counsel should have investigated and presented this evidence in view of the extremely probative and wrenching nature of the evidence, the sparseness of the mitigating evidence actually offered, the prosecution's focus on the defense's failure to provide substantial mitigating evidence, and the fact the jury took three days to reach a verdict in favor of death.  The court stressed such evidence was vital for informing the jury about the background and character of the defendant in a capital case so that the defendant is treated as a uniquely individual human being and a reliable determination is made that death is the appropriate sentence...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Capital Conviction and Death Sentence Because Counsel Failed to Investigate Defendant's Mental Health and Drug Abuse Problems Not Disturbed

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Woodford v. Jennings, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 3795 (July 1, 2003)

Perhaps reflecting its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a Ninth Circuit ruling that overturned a capital conviction and imposition of the death penalty for ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant's attorney failed to discover and present easily available evidence of the defendant's mental health and drug abuse problems despite knowing that the defendant had such problems.  The defendant was a habitual, heavy methamphetamine user, had attempted suicide, was described by a psychiatrist as schizophrenic, had a long history of injuring himself and pouring liquids in the resulting wounds causing gangrene, and had been involuntarily committed for psychiatric evaluation because he appeared catatonic. In addition, a number of individuals told the attorney they thought something was "seriously wrong" with the defendant...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Reversal of Capital Conviction Because Counsel Failed to Request Diminished Capacity Jury Instruction to Reflect Defendant's "Explosive Dyscontrol" from Chronic Drug Use Not Disturbed

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Morgan v. Pirtle, 123 S. Ct. 2286 (2003); 71(47) U.S. Law Week 3756 (June 10, 2003)

Perhaps presaging its decision in Wiggins (described above), the Supreme Court declined to review a ruling of the Ninth Circuit that overturned a first-degree murder convic­tion for ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because defendant's attorney failed to request a dimin­ished capacity jury instruction. At trial, the defendant testified he ingested methamphet­amines, cocaine, and marijuana the night before the murder but was "coming down" three hours before the murder. Despite this evidence the drugs he used were wearing off three hours before the murder, defense counsel requested an intoxication instruction...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Officials Can Force Convicted Murderer to Take Medication to Make Sane Enough to Be Executed Not Disturbed

Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a ruling by the Eighth Circuit that allowed Arkansas officials to force a convicted murderer to take medication intended to make him sane enough to be executed.  In 1986 the Supreme Court held that executing an insane individual violates the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. However, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether an individual can be forcibly medicated to be made sane enough to qualify for an execution...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling that Dangerous Student May Be Suspended Pending Psychiatric Evaluation Not Disturbed

Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Geffrey W., 293 A.2d 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, Waxman v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 123 S. Ct. 2077 (2003); 71(44) U.S. Law Week 3719 (May 20, 2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a decision by a New York appellate court that upheld the suspension of a public school student from school and his placement in homebound instruction pending the completion of a psychiatric evaluation of the student and review by the school district's committee on special education.  Under New York law, a school district may not unilaterally change a student's placement from regular instruction to homebound instruction while proceedings to determine whether the student is disabled are pending, even when a student poses a danger to himself or others. However, the New York appellate court determined a school district is entitled to seek a judicial ruling to extend a student's suspension upon a showing that maintaining the student in his current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or to others.  The New York court found that such a showing had been made when it was undisputed that the student had without permission run out of classrooms and school buildings dangerously close to the Long Island Expressway, chased other students in the classroom, hit teachers and students with either a folder or crumpled paper, and chewed on sharp objects while leaning back in his chair....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Ruling Ordering Evidentiary Hearing on Whether Defendant's Confession to Prison Psychiatrist Was Involuntary Because He Believed Statements Were Protected by Confidentiality Agreement Not Disturbed

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Stewart v. Beaty, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003); 71(44) U.S. Law Week 3715 (May 20, 2003)

The Supreme Court declined to review a decision by the Ninth Circuit that permitted a criminal defendant to obtain a new hearing on whether his confession had been involuntary under the Fifth Amendment.  The defendant had been convicted of murder partly on the strength of a prison psychiatrist's testimony regarding a confession the defendant made to him after a group therapy session.  The Ninth Circuit held the defendant was entitled to a hearing on whether he reasonably believed his statements to the psychiatrist were protected by a confidentiality agreement he had signed that promised that "all group communication" would be kept confidential...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Two-Year Ban on Visits to Inmates with Two Substance-Abuse Violations Upheld

Overton v. Bazzetta, 123 S. Ct. 2162 (2003)

The Supreme Court upheld a Michigan prison regulation that prisoners with two substance abuse violations could not receive any visitors except attorneys and members of the clergy for two years.  In a unanimous decision, the Court noted drug smuggling and drug use in prison are intractable problems and asserted withdrawing visitation privileges is a proper and even necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules governing inmate behavior.  The Court did add it might reach a different conclusion if the ban was for a much longer period of time, treated as a de facto permanent ban, or applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

"Treating Physician Rule" for Making Disability Benefit Determinations Under Employee Benefit Plans Rejected

Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965 (2003); 71(45) U.S. Law Week  1720 (May 27, 2003)

The Supreme Court unanimously held that although special weight is given to a claimant's treating physician (the "treating physician rule") in determining whether a claimant is entitled to Social Security disability benefits, an administrator of an employee benefit plan is not required to similarly give preferential weight to the opinion of an employees' treating physician.  Such benefit plans are governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  The Ninth Circuit had ruled that ERISA, like the Social Security Act, imposed the "treating physician rule."  The Supreme Court rejected this position and determined a plan administrator was free to give greater weight to the conclusions of a physician who conducted an independent assessment at the behest of the plan administrator than to the employee's treating physician.  The Court concluded employee benefit plans were best served by preserving for them the greatest flexibility possible in their processing of employee health benefit claims....

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Death Penalty Reversed Because Counsel Did Not Conduct "Reasonable" Investigation of Defendant's Childhood History

Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); 71(50) U.S. Law Week 1798-99 (July 1, 2003)

Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the "effective assistance" of an attorney.  In a Maryland case, the Supreme Court ruled a capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyers failed to conduct a "reasonable" investigation of the defendant's childhood history before deciding not to present related mitigation evidence at sentencing.  According to the Court, the attorneys should have pursued childhood privation and abuse leads brought to their attention by the records they reviewed...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

Yates' Conviction Reversed for State's Use of False Testimony by Mental Health Expert Concerning "Law & Order" Episode

Yates v. State, No. 01-02-00462-CR, 2005 WL 20416 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2005)

The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the capital murder conviction of Andrea Yates obtained in connection with the drowning deaths of her young children in a bathtub in their home. At trial, Yates asserted an insanity defense and four psychiatrists and a psychologist testified that, as a result of her mental illness, Yates did not know right from wrong...

Found in DMHL Volume 24 Issue 2