Competence to Stand Trial, Prosecutor

Jackson v. Superior Court, 406 P.3d 782 (Cal. 2017)

The Supreme Court of California found that the prosecution was permitted to dismiss prior charges and refile identical charges where the defendant had been committed for the duration of the statutory period while being evaluated for competence to stand trial; provided, however, that if found still incompetent to stand trial, the defendant could not be re-committed for another statutory period.

Found in DMHL Volume 37, Issue 1

Sexual Assault Conviction Reversed Because Prosecutor Told Jury that Commonly Known Children Don't Report Sexual Assaults Right Away

Smith v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d 481 (Va. Ct. App. 2003); 17(51) Virginia Lawyers Weekly 1291 (May 26, 2003)

The Virginia Court of Appeals overturned a sexual assault conviction because the trial court failed to specifically direct the jury to disregard a statement made by the prosecutor during jury selection that "it's commonly known that children don't report sexual assaults right away, if at all."  The court noted in this case the credibility of the victims was vital to the Commonwealth's case because only the victims' testimony proved defendant was the perpetrator of these assaults.
Furthermore, a major factor affecting their credibility was their delay in reporting the assaults to an adult...

Found in DMHL Volume 23 Issue 1

NY’s High Court Rules Testimony by Prosecutor's Forensic Psychiatrist Recounting 3rd-Party Statements Where 3rd Parties Aren’t Available for Cross-Exam Violates Fed Constitution and Isn’t Admissible

People v. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09654, 2005 WL 3477726 (N.Y. Dec. 20, 2005).

In recent years forensic evaluators have been encouraged to expand the information on which they rely beyond their examination of the defendant and the clinical record to include third-party data from sources such as family and acquaintances of the defendant.  A ruling by the high court of New York has placed limits in that state on testimony based on this practice and raised issues that may reverberate in other states...

Found in DMHL Volume 25 Issue 1

Government Fails to Carry Burden to Forcibly Medicate Incompetent Defendant

United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the trial court and found that the Government did not meet its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the Sell factors authorizing treatment of a defendant over his objection.

The defendant in this case, a Mexican citizen with an extensive criminal history of drug offenses, was charged with illegal reentry into the United States. Diagnosed with a delusional disorder, grandiose type, he was found incompetent to stand trial and sent to Butner Correctional Institution in North Carolina for treatment. At an administrative hearing, the defendant was found not to be a danger to himself or others in the institutional setting and did not suffer from a grave disability justifying involuntary medication. Thus the sole issue before the court was whether the defendant could be medicated over objection for the purpose of restoring his competency to stand trial.

Under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the factors enunciated by the United States Supreme Court: 1) that important governmental interests are at stake; 2) involuntary medication will significantly further that interest, i.e. it is substantially likely to restore defendant to competency and substantially unlikely to cause side effects that would impair significantly his ability to assist in his defense; 3) involuntary medication is necessary to further those governmental interests; and 4) treatment with medication is medically appropriate.

The magistrate judge considered the evidence and concluded that the government had proved its case. The Court of Appeals reversed finding that this case does not present one of those rare circumstances permitting medication over objection to render the defendant competent to stand trial and the government had not met its burden under Sell’s second and fourth prong. Although the defendant had never been treated with antipsychotic medications, the Court held that the government must prove what the medication will do, not what it is designed to do. The appellate court discounted the testimony of the government’s experts and relied on the testimony of the defendant’s expert who testified that the medication was likely to worsen his rare and difficult to treat mental disorder and increase his delusional thinking, especially based upon his inferiority feelings and hypersensitivity to powerlessness. It found that treatment with haldol would also unduly subject him to the risk of tardive dyskinesia. The court therefore found that treatment with medication was medically inappropriate.

Found in DMHL Volume 30 Issue 3

Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI)

State v. Dalton, No. 336PA15, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1121 (Dec. 21, 2016)

Supreme Court of North Carolina rules that a prosecutor's closing argument exaggerating the likelihood of defendant's release if found not guilty by reason of insanity constituted prejudicial error because the statements were not supported by the evidence.

Background: Melissa Amber Dalton had a history of substance abuse and mental illness. She received inpatient treatment in July 2009 and was diagnosed with cocaine dependence, cannabis abuse, substance abuse mood disorder, borderline personality disorder, and intrauterine pregnancy. Dalton’s treating physician prescribed Lexapro, an SSRI, but was unaware that Dalton had previously reacted negatively to a different SSRI. Dalton was released approximately three days later. About three weeks later, Dalton went to the apartment of two neighbors, claiming to have money she owed them. When the neighbors opened the door, Dalton stabbed both of them repeatedly, killing one and seriously wounding the other. Dalton was indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. Dalton pled not guilty by reason of insanity. During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that if Dalton was found not guilty by reason of insanity that it was “very possible” she would be back home within 50 days. The jury found Dalton guilty on all counts. The court of appeals found prejudicial error in the prosecutor’s closing arguments and granted Dalton a new trial.

Holding: The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that statements in closing arguments about a defendant’s likelihood of release must be supported by evidence presented at trial. The court found no evidence to support the prosecutor’s statement that it was “very possible” Dalton would be released within 50 days. The court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals.

Notable Point: Miranda Rights and Insanity Defense: On appeal the defendant also raised the issue of the prosecutor using evidence that she invoked her Miranda rights after arrest to prove she was sane. However, the court of appeals did not address this argument in reaching its decision and relied solely on the prosecutor’s statement in closing arguments about her possibility of release.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4