Juvenile Offenders; Knowing Waiver of Right Against Self-Incrimination

Ohio v. Barker, 2016 Ohio 2708 (Ohio 2016)

Ohio Supreme Court rules that Ohio law providing that recorded statements made by defendant in custodial setting are presumed to be voluntary violates juvenile’s right to due process and does not remove burden from the state to prove that waiver of right against self-incrimination was knowingly made. 

Background: In October 2011, Tyshawn Barker was questioned by police while in custody concerning the shooting deaths of two individuals. The detectives recorded the interrogation, read Barker the Miranda warnings, and asked him to sign a “Notification of Rights” form, explaining “…I am going to ask you to sign it. You’re not admitting to anything. I am just telling you it just says that I read you this [the warnings], okay?” The form included a preprinted statement, “I understand my rights,” but did not indicate that by signing the form it would waive rights. Barker was evaluated as part of the juvenile court’s determination about transfer, and he was found to have a low IQ, below-gradelevel academic abilities, and to have an individualized education plan. Barker was transferred to adult court, where he moved to have his statements suppressed, arguing that he had not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The trial court dismissed his motion, not making a finding on his waiver, but finding that he had voluntarily made statements. Ohio law (R.C. 2933.81(B)) stated that recorded interrogations were presumed voluntary. Barker was convicted and he appealed. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, finding support in the record for the trial court’s decision about his rights waiver despite the absence of an express finding on the point. Barker appealed.

Holding: The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded. The Court distinguished two issues: the rights waiver issue, which was rooted in the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and voluntary statements issue, which was rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment due process right. Addressing the rights waiver, the Court found that R.C. 2933.81(B) did not apply to waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, and noted that state and federal case law make clear that rights waivers cannot be presumed and state legislatures cannot supersede federal constitutional law. Ultimately, the Court held that the state retains the burden of proving that Barker waived his rights. As to the second issue, the Court noted that juveniles require greater protections than adults. The Court noted that voluntariness of statements is assessed via the totality of circumstances test, and that R.C. 2933.81(B) effectively blocked consideration of the totality of circumstances, at least in juvenile cases, by its presumption of voluntariness. Ultimately, it held the law to be unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Liability of Correctional and Mental Health Officials

Glasgow v. Nebraska, 819 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2016)

Correctional and mental health officials do not owe a duty to third parties for injuries inflicted by inmates who are returned to the community following assessment by those officials. 

Background: Nikko Jenkins was a mentally ill inmate who was released from prison after 10.5 years of his sentence because the state changed Jenkins’ recommendation from inpatient to outpatient treatment, which accelerated his release. Upon his release, Jenkins killed 4 people in Omaha, one of them Curtis Bradford. Bradford’s mother, Velita Glasgow, filed suit against the state of Nebraska, among other defendants, for violation of Bradford’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (§1983) and a state law negligence claim, arguing that the state acted with deliberate indifference in accelerating a dangerous prisoner’s release and violated Bradford’s right to life. Additionally, she argued that the state had a duty to protect Bradford from their prisoners and the state abandoned that duty when they knowingly released a mentally-ill prisoner who allegedly threatened to kill someone if he was released. The district court dismissed Glasgow’s claim, stating that the complaint was “devoid of any plausible allegation against [the] defendants.” Glasgow appealed.

Holding: The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of all claims. An official may be sued if they violated a statutory or constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct. The Eighth Circuit held that “there is no general substantive due process right to be protected against the release of criminals from confinement.” Furthermore, because there was no evidence that the state’s conduct created a significant risk to a precisely defined group of people and that, if that group existed, Bradford was a part of that group, the state was not required by the Due Process clause to protect Bradford’s life from private actors. The court quickly did away with the negligence claim by holding that the plaintiff did not provide any legal authority to explain that the state had a legal duty to Bradford.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Conditions of Pre-trial Confinement

Montano v. Orange Cnty., Tex., 842 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2016)

Fifth Circuit upholds jury verdict finding a county jail liable for unconstitutional conditions of pre-trial confinement that resulted in the death of an inmate who was mentally ill, but assumed to be under the influence of bath salts, because evidence showed a “de facto” policy of prolonged detention without proper medical supervision for inmates held in a jail infirmary observation room for detoxification.

Background: Robert Montano was arrested for public intoxication and was taken to the county jail after a judge signed an affidavit of probable cause. The arresting officer told the intake officer at the jail that she suspected Montano was under the influence of bath salts. Montano was placed in an observation cell because he was determined to be incoherent and unable to complete the booking process. The cell did not have a sink, toilet or toilet paper. Montano was previously treated for mental illness and was in the state mental-health database, but no database query was run during his intake despite a Texas requirement to do so. While in the cell, Montano was observed by a Licensed Vocational Nurse (LVN), the Texas equivalent of a Licensed Practical Nurse, but no contract physician visited the jail during the four-and-one-half days that Montano was in the cell. There was little or no attention given to Montano during his time in the cell, and no jail staff entered the cell until the morning of his death, more than four days later. There was evidence at trial that 1) the view of Montano’s cell was partially obscured by paper taped over the cell’s glass walls, 2) his vitals were taken no more than once, and 3) food was offered through a slot in the door. More than four days after being detained in the cell, an LVN reported that it appeared as though Montano was not breathing. At that time, the cell was littered with uneaten food and human waste. The LVN reported Montano’s condition to the jail control room, but waited 20 minutes for a corporal to respond before calling an ambulance or entering the cell. Montano was pronounced dead 34 minutes later and the cause of death was determined to be acute renal failure. An action was filed against the county for unconstitutional confinement and episodic acts or omissions. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $1.5 million for pain and $917,000 for wrongful death. The county appealed seeking a new trial contending that insufficient evidence had been presented to support the jury’s verdict and the damages awarded were excessive.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit denied the county’s motion and upheld the jury verdict finding that sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable jury to conclude that the conditions of confinement caused Montano’s death, and that those conditions were the result of a “de facto” policy that denied detainees adequate care for an indefinite period of time. The Court further found that the damages awarded were not excessive.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4