Involuntary Commitment; Constitutional Due Process

In re the Det. of M.W. & W.D. v. Dep’t Soc. & Health Serv., Washington, W. State Hosp., No. 90570-3, 2016 WL 3249495 (Wash. June 9, 2016) (en banc)

Washington Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of state statutory provisions authorizing commitment and re-commitment of individuals with mental illness on the grounds that they were charged with violent felonies and continued to present substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts, even after original charges dismissed on the grounds that the individuals were unrestorably incompetent to stand trial.

Background: The respondents' cases were unrelated but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of involuntary recommitment. M.W. and W.D. were both charged with violent felonies and had their charges dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. In each case, the court ordered mental health evaluations to determine if they should be involuntarily committed, and each man was committed for 180 days of involuntary treatment. Prior to the expiration of the men’s commitments, the State utilized a new procedure for recommitting a person based on a judge’s finding that the person committed a violent felony. The new procedure allowed for recommitment in some circumstances based on a preliminary hearing, rather than a full evidentiary hearing, to determine whether “the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder or developmental disability that results in a substantial likelihood of committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.” The individual would then have the opportunity to rebut any findings through admissible expert testimony. The superior court commissioner declared the former statute unconstitutional and ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds.

Holding: On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the procedure for involuntary commitment did not violate substantive or procedural due process, vagueness or equal protection. The court also ruled that the statute did not violate an individual’s right to a jury trial because the periods of commitment are short and the state has a high burden of proof for recommitment. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court and upheld the statute at issue as constitutional.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for Involuntary Custody

Myers v. Patterson, 819 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2016)

Second Circuit finds that the district court record was insufficient to support a finding of qualified immunity for police officer responding to child protective services report who took a mother into custody based on finding of danger to self or others due to mental illness, and remands for further proceedings.

Background: A Child Protective Services caseworker, Jodi Weitzman, was assigned to investigate Julia Johnson after reports from her son’s school. Weitzman eventually summoned police to Johnson’s home, believing that she should be sent for a psychological evaluation. The only record of the arrest was Weitzman’s handwritten notes; the police officer did not take notes and did not testify. The notes described Johnson as annoyed and uncooperative, and her son, DJM, as fearful. The officer, Patterson, arrested Johnson and she was sent to a medical facility for evaluation. The district court granted Patterson qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because Johnson did not put forth evidence that would suggest Patterson was not making a reasonable decision as a police officer when he detained her. The officer’s motion for summary judgment was granted.

Holding: A police officer must have probable cause to believe a person is at risk of harming himself or others in order to lawfully detain them. A police officer would have probable cause if other reasonable police officers would not disagree with his conduct or he was acting under the professional judgment of a licensed caseworker. The Second Circuit found that the record had insufficient detail to make a probable cause determination, one way or the other. The court vacated the district court’s assignment of qualified immunity and remanded the case to that court in order to further develop the record and reconsider the question of qualified immunity.

Notable Points:

Assessment for probable cause is anchored at time of custody: After Johnson was arrested, she was found to be a danger to herself and others, according to the psychological evaluation. Eventually, her parental rights were severed. Regardless of whether the subsequent facts make Patterson’s arrest seem more plausible, the court would only consider the facts at the time of the conduct.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Judicial Order Authorizing Involuntary Administration of Medication in Hospital Setting

In re I.G., 2016 VT 95

Vermont Supreme Court reverses lower court order authorizing medication over objection of involuntarily committed patient because the lower court failed to make specific findings on whether patient’s written statement of objection to medication, made prior to hospitalization, was a competent refusal that had to be honored under Vermont law.

Background: I.G. was hospitalized at the Vermont Psychiatric Care Hospital (VPCH) pursuant to a court order stemming from an arrest for assaulting his girlfriend. I.G. was previously hospitalized at VPCH and was diagnosed with schizophrenia. When he was discharged from VPCH after the previous hospitalization, he started living at a residence for people with mental illness. While there, I.G. signed a document purported to be an advance directive stating that he did not want any psychiatric medication. Following I.G.’s current hospitalization, VCPH filed an application to involuntarily medicate I.G. After a hearing, the trial court ordered I.G.’s involuntary medication for 90 days. I.G. appealed. 

Holding: The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not adequately address the issue of whether the purported advance directive was a competent written expression or preference regarding medication according to Vermont statute. The court reversed and remanded for a determination of I.G.’s competency at the time of signing the advance directive.

Notable Point:

Advance directive: The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court even though the advance directive at issue in this case did not meet the statutory requirements of an advance directive because it was not signed by two witnesses.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Burden of Proof for Involuntary Commitment

In re Hospitalization of Mark V., 375 P.3d 51 (Alaska 2016)

Alaska Supreme Court rules that for involuntary commitment based upon the person’s inability to care for self in the community, the petitioner has the burden to prove that, even with the services and supports that are available in the community, the person is too disabled to care for self and that commitment is the least restrictive alternative.

Background: Anchorage police took Mark V. into custody and transported him to an emergency psychiatric facility after he was found nude in public claiming to be the King of England. The treatment facility petitioned the superior court for an ex parte order authorizing Mark’s hospitalization at Alaska Psychiatric Institute based on a determination that he was “gravely disabled” as a result of paranoid schizophrenia. The superior court granted the petition and ordered an evaluation period of 72 hours. During that initial evaluation period, Mark’s treating psychiatrist filed a petition seeking to extend Mark’s commitment for an additional 30 days. The superior court approved the 30-day commitment order based on testimony by Mark’s psychiatrist that Mark’s inappropriate behavior would continue if he were released before his manic symptoms improved.

Holding: The Alaska Supreme Court held that a 30-day commitment petition must allege less restrictive alternatives have been considered and petitioners must prove by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing that there are no less restrictive alternatives. The court found that this burden was met during the hearing and affirmed the decision of the superior court granting the 30-day commitment.

Notable Point:

No less restrictive alternative: The court explained that it is a constitutional prerequisite for involuntary commitment to prove that no less restrictive alternatives exist.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators

Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 792 S.E.2d 3 (Va. 2016)

Supreme Court of Virginia holds that in an action to involuntarily commit a convicted rapist as a sexually violent predator testimony by victims of sexual assault committed by the defendant is relevant and corroborative of the evaluation of the defendant and is not unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court’s exclusion of such victim testimony is reversible error.

Background: The Commonwealth of Virginia initiated proceedings to involuntarily commit Brady Arnold Proffitt, Jr. as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). A clinical psychologist evaluated Proffitt and diagnosed him with sexual sadism disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and alcohol use disorder. She gave testimony during the trial that Proffitt was a sexually violent predator and at risk of reoffending if released without treatment. The Commonwealth then attempted to call two of Proffitt’s rape victims as witnesses. Proffitt objected to the testimony as unfairly prejudicial because his rape conviction was already in evidence. The circuit court agreed and excluded the testimony.

Holding: The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the victim testimony was not unfairly prejudicial because the testimony would directly support the elements of the case that Proffitt met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator.

Notable Point:

Rules of Evidence: The court conceded that the rules of evidence prohibit the introduction of evidence to prove that a defendant acted in conformity with a character trait. However, in the present case the material issue was whether Proffitt had a mental abnormality or personality disorder making him likely to engage in sexually violent acts in the future. The court explained that this made it proper to introduce evidence of specific conduct to prove the existence of a character trait that was a required element of the case.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4

Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators

In re Care & Treatment of Ellison, 384 P.3d 15 (Kan. 2016)

Supreme Court of Kansas holds that an ad hoc analysis of all of the factors resulting in a pretrial delay must be used to determine whether a defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial has been violated during proceedings for his involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.

Background: Todd Ellison was a convicted sex offender, and the state of Kansas sought to have him involuntarily committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). The KSVPA allows for the civil commitment of persons alleged to be sexually violent predators after the completion of their criminal sentences. A person suspected of meeting the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator is entitled to a probable cause hearing and a jury trial during which the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The state filed a probable cause petition against Ellison in June 2009, but his trial was delayed more than 4 years due to multiple continuances. Ellison filed a motion claiming the delay violated his due process right to a speedy trial. The district court ruled that the delay violated Ellison’s due process rights and ordered his release. The court of appeals reversed and the state supreme court granted Ellison’s petition for review to determine the appropriate standard to measure due process claims for pretrial delays in KSVPA proceedings.

Holding: The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the ad hoc analysis from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) in which courts must weigh various factors including the length of the delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant applies to pretrial delays in KSVPA proceedings. The court held that the district court did not err in weighing the different factors that caused the delay in Ellison’s trial under the Barker analysis and affirmed the order for his release.

Notable Points:

Barker Factors: The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the district court on the assumption that too much weight was given to the 4-year delay and other factors were not properly considered. The Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that no one factor is either necessary or sufficient in determining whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated and that the district court had properly considered other factors in reaching its decision.
Reason for Pretrial Delay: The district court inquired into which party was responsible for the continuances that led to the delay in Ellison’s trial. The court determined that some of the continuances were attributable to Ellison and others were by agreement. When the party responsible for any delay could not be determined, the court attributed it to the state. The court considered only the delay that was attributable to the state in reaching its decision in this case.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4