Sexual Abuse and Psychological Injury; Statute of Limitations

Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016)

For cases where the childhood sexual abuse occurred before October 1977, the two-year statute of limitations for civil action seeking damages starts when the victim reaches majority. As of October 1977, the two-year statute of limitations starts to run either after the victim has attained majority or after the victim has been advised by a licensed physician or psychologist that the person has an injury caused by the prior abuse.

Background: Nancy Haynes alleged that Sean Haggerty had a sexual relationship with her between the years of 1971 and 1975, while she was a minor. Haynes reached majority in March of 1975. In October 1977, Virginia Code Section 8.01-249(6) was passed, which dictated that causes of action based on childhood sexual abuse accrue when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the abuse is first communicated to the victim by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. This statute specifically noted that victimizations that occurred before the passing of this statute would be dictated by the former statute, which stated that causes of action based on childhood sexual abuse accrue upon reaching majority. In May of 2012, Haynes was diagnosed by her therapist with Dysthymic Disorder, which the therapist said was a result of Haggerty sexually abusing her when she was a minor. Haynes brought suit against Haggerty seeking damages for sexual assault and battery.

The circuit court held that the statute of limitations applicable in 1975 had expired before the passage of 8.01-249(6) and thus its application to this case would deprive Haggerty of due process and property right to a statute of limitations defense. Also, the court concluded that Haynes’ extremely protracted failure to act though being fully aware of Haggerty’s sexual misconduct would egregiously undermine Haggerty’s constitutional rights to due process. Haynes appealed the decision.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that Haynes’ causes of actions were dictated by the preceding statute, which stated that the statute of limitations governing the claims would be tolled until the alleged victim reached majority. 8.01-249(6) therefore did not apply to Haynes’ claim and the circuit court did not err in granting Haggerty’s plea in bar.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Imposition of Probation Conditions Requiring Sex Offender Treatment

Villanueva v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly 319 (2016)

Florida Supreme Court rules that probation condition requirement that defendant attend sex offender therapy was invalid because it did not bear a “reasonable relation” to rehabilitation where defendant was charged with lewd and lascivious molestation but convicted of misdemeanor battery.

Background: Villanueva was charged with one count of lewd and lascivious molestation of a child older than 12 but less than 16 years old. The victim was Villanueva’s daughter, who testified that Villanueva touched her breast and buttocks on three separate occasions. The jury acquitted Villanueva of lewd and lascivious molestation, but found him guilty of a lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The trial judge sentenced Villanueva to 90 days in jail followed by one year of probation. A special condition of the probation was a requirement that Villanueva participate in sex offender therapy pursuant to a Florida statute. That statute set probation standards including sex offender treatment for certain enumerated offenses, which included the charge of lewd and lascivious molestation, but not misdemeanor battery. Villanueva appealed, raising the issue of whether sex offender therapy was restricted by statute to only the enumerated offenses and whether the imposition the condition in this case comports with probation standards announced by the Florida Supreme Court in Biller. The district court upheld the sex offender treatment imposed by the trial court.

Holding: The Florida Supreme Court ruled that sex offender treatment was not limited to certain enumerated offenses, overruling a lower court decision in Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). The court also ruled that the imposition of sex offender treatment in the present case was invalid under Biller, because the condition did not rationally relate to future criminality.

Notable Point:

Rational relation to future criminality: The court explained that Villanueva’s conviction of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery indicated that the touching was not committed in a lewd and lascivious manner; therefore, he should not be a candidate for sex offender treatment. The court also relied on the fact that Villanueva did not have any prior convictions.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Probation Supervision of Sex Offenders and Delegation of Judicial Authority

United States v. Morin, No. 15-50197, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14549 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2016).

Fifth Circuit rules District Court’s probation requirement that the offender comply with “unspecified lifestyle restrictions” imposed by the offender’s therapist during supervised release constitutes an unauthorized delegation of judicial authority and the oral sentencing pronouncement controls when in conflict with the written record.

Background: Robert Morin pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The district court sentenced Morin to 33 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Morin challenged two conditions of his supervised release. He contended that the district court impermissibly delegated judicial authority by directing that Morin comply with unspecified "lifestyle restrictions" that might be imposed by a therapist throughout the term of his supervised release. He contended that the breadth of this requirement permitted a therapist, not the court, “to decide the nature and extent of the punishment imposed.” Morin additionally argued that the written requirement that he abstain from the use of alcohol during his term of supervised release was not included in the district court's oral pronouncement of the sentence, making it invalid. Holding: The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated the two challenged conditions.

Notable Point:

Scope of conditions of supervised release: The Fifth Circuit emphasized that only courts have the authority to impose conditions of supervised release beyond the mandatory restrictions. The court agreed that the manner and means of therapy during treatment may be devised by therapists. Therapists and other non-judicial actors could forward to the court recommendations for new conditions.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 3

Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators

Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 792 S.E.2d 3 (Va. 2016)

Supreme Court of Virginia holds that in an action to involuntarily commit a convicted rapist as a sexually violent predator testimony by victims of sexual assault committed by the defendant is relevant and corroborative of the evaluation of the defendant and is not unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court’s exclusion of such victim testimony is reversible error.

Background: The Commonwealth of Virginia initiated proceedings to involuntarily commit Brady Arnold Proffitt, Jr. as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). A clinical psychologist evaluated Proffitt and diagnosed him with sexual sadism disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and alcohol use disorder. She gave testimony during the trial that Proffitt was a sexually violent predator and at risk of reoffending if released without treatment. The Commonwealth then attempted to call two of Proffitt’s rape victims as witnesses. Proffitt objected to the testimony as unfairly prejudicial because his rape conviction was already in evidence. The circuit court agreed and excluded the testimony.

Holding: The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the victim testimony was not unfairly prejudicial because the testimony would directly support the elements of the case that Proffitt met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator.

Notable Point:

Rules of Evidence: The court conceded that the rules of evidence prohibit the introduction of evidence to prove that a defendant acted in conformity with a character trait. However, in the present case the material issue was whether Proffitt had a mental abnormality or personality disorder making him likely to engage in sexually violent acts in the future. The court explained that this made it proper to introduce evidence of specific conduct to prove the existence of a character trait that was a required element of the case.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4

Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators

In re Care & Treatment of Ellison, 384 P.3d 15 (Kan. 2016)

Supreme Court of Kansas holds that an ad hoc analysis of all of the factors resulting in a pretrial delay must be used to determine whether a defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial has been violated during proceedings for his involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.

Background: Todd Ellison was a convicted sex offender, and the state of Kansas sought to have him involuntarily committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). The KSVPA allows for the civil commitment of persons alleged to be sexually violent predators after the completion of their criminal sentences. A person suspected of meeting the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator is entitled to a probable cause hearing and a jury trial during which the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The state filed a probable cause petition against Ellison in June 2009, but his trial was delayed more than 4 years due to multiple continuances. Ellison filed a motion claiming the delay violated his due process right to a speedy trial. The district court ruled that the delay violated Ellison’s due process rights and ordered his release. The court of appeals reversed and the state supreme court granted Ellison’s petition for review to determine the appropriate standard to measure due process claims for pretrial delays in KSVPA proceedings.

Holding: The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the ad hoc analysis from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) in which courts must weigh various factors including the length of the delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant applies to pretrial delays in KSVPA proceedings. The court held that the district court did not err in weighing the different factors that caused the delay in Ellison’s trial under the Barker analysis and affirmed the order for his release.

Notable Points:

Barker Factors: The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the district court on the assumption that too much weight was given to the 4-year delay and other factors were not properly considered. The Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that no one factor is either necessary or sufficient in determining whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated and that the district court had properly considered other factors in reaching its decision.
Reason for Pretrial Delay: The district court inquired into which party was responsible for the continuances that led to the delay in Ellison’s trial. The court determined that some of the continuances were attributable to Ellison and others were by agreement. When the party responsible for any delay could not be determined, the court attributed it to the state. The court considered only the delay that was attributable to the state in reaching its decision in this case.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 4