Provider Liability; Claims by Third Parties

Mitchell v. State, 369 P.3d 299 (Idaho 2016)

Idaho Supreme Court rules that the victim of a shooting by a person with mental illness who had been discharged from treatment services by the state’s mental health services program may pursue a claim against the state that his injury was the result of a negligent termination of services.

Background: Gerald Simpson had been receiving mental health services from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (IDHW) Adult Mental Health program until he was released on June 23, 2010. On September 27, 2010, Simpson shot Ryan Mitchell in the back outside of a coffee shop. Approximately ten days after the shooting, psychologist Daniel Traughber, Ph.D., prepared a memorandum on behalf of the IDHW explaining the processes and procedures that were used to terminate mental health services, subsequent to budget cuts, in a way that “reduced the risk of harm to patients and/or the community.” In August 2012, the district court dismissed the criminal charges against Simpson due to Simpson’s lack of competency to stand trial. Shortly thereafter, Mitchell filed this suit alleging that the State violated Mitchell’s constitutional and victims’ rights and was negligent when it discontinued Simpson’s mental health services. The district court issued an order granting summary judgment to the State on all claims.

Holding: On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that Mitchell’s victims’ rights claim was properly dismissed, but that the claim for negligence had been dismissed in error. The court determined that there was insufficient admissible evidence for the district court to make a determination as to whether the decision to cut Simpson from IDHW's mental health services was operational or discretionary. Thus, the district court erred in holding that the State’s decision to close Simpson’s file was discretionary and therefore erred in granting summary judgment to the State on Mitchell’s negligence claim.

Notable Points:

Mitchell’s negligence claim turns on whether IDHW's decision to release Simpson from its Adult Mental Health program was a discretionary function or an operational function: If the State’s decision to discontinue Simpson’s mental health services was a discretionary function then it would entitle the State to immunity. Here, there were insufficient facts for the trial court to determine whether IDHW's decision to cut Simpson from its health services was operational or discretionary. The evidence did not indicate who made the decision to close Simpson's file or how that decision was made.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2

Liability of Correctional and Mental Health Officials

Glasgow v. Nebraska, 819 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2016)

Correctional and mental health officials do not owe a duty to third parties for injuries inflicted by inmates who are returned to the community following assessment by those officials. 

Background: Nikko Jenkins was a mentally ill inmate who was released from prison after 10.5 years of his sentence because the state changed Jenkins’ recommendation from inpatient to outpatient treatment, which accelerated his release. Upon his release, Jenkins killed 4 people in Omaha, one of them Curtis Bradford. Bradford’s mother, Velita Glasgow, filed suit against the state of Nebraska, among other defendants, for violation of Bradford’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (§1983) and a state law negligence claim, arguing that the state acted with deliberate indifference in accelerating a dangerous prisoner’s release and violated Bradford’s right to life. Additionally, she argued that the state had a duty to protect Bradford from their prisoners and the state abandoned that duty when they knowingly released a mentally-ill prisoner who allegedly threatened to kill someone if he was released. The district court dismissed Glasgow’s claim, stating that the complaint was “devoid of any plausible allegation against [the] defendants.” Glasgow appealed.

Holding: The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of all claims. An official may be sued if they violated a statutory or constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct. The Eighth Circuit held that “there is no general substantive due process right to be protected against the release of criminals from confinement.” Furthermore, because there was no evidence that the state’s conduct created a significant risk to a precisely defined group of people and that, if that group existed, Bradford was a part of that group, the state was not required by the Due Process clause to protect Bradford’s life from private actors. The court quickly did away with the negligence claim by holding that the plaintiff did not provide any legal authority to explain that the state had a legal duty to Bradford.

Found in DMHL Volume 35, Issue 2